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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller

ABSTRACT
When should specific performance be available for breach of contract? This question has
engaged generations of legal economists and philosophers, historians and comparativists.
Yet none of these disciplines has provided a persuasive answer. This Article provides a
normatively‐attractive and conceptually‐coherent account. Respect for the autonomy of
the promisor’s future self explains why expectation damages are, and should be, the
ordinary remedy for contract breach. Also, this same normative commitment to the
contracting parties’ autonomy best justifies the “uniqueness exception,” where specific
performance is typically awarded, and the personal services exclusion, where it is not. For
the most part, the boundaries of specific performance track the common law’s underlying
commitment to autonomy. But not entirely. There’s still work to be done, and this Article
points the way with concrete doctrinal reforms that can better align specific performance
with its animating principles.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Hanoch Dagan* & Michael Heller**

I. INTRODUCTION

When should specific performance be available for breach of contract? Civil
law systems make it the primary remedy for breach, while the common law treats
it as a humble exception with limited application. The same sharp split exists in
legal theory, with philosophers tending to endorse the civil law tradition and
economists praising the common law. The net result: the law and theory of specific
performance oscillates between incompatible reforms and values.
There is a better approach. This Article shows how autonomy, rightly
understood, makes sense of the current law of specific performance and offers
well‐grounded reforms that can bring the doctrine closer to its animating
principles. By anchoring this contract remedy in a conceptually‐coherent and
normatively‐attractive framework, we can break the decades‐long logjam in one
of the field’s foundational debates.
At root, contract is an empowering practice that is, and should be, guided
by an autonomy‐enhancing mission.1 Contract’s operative doctrines – including
Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation & Director of the
Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Tel‐Aviv University.
*

Lawrence A. Wien Professor of Real Estate Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to
Ronen Avraham, Oren Bar‐Gill, Samuel Becher, Itzik Benbaji, Leora Bilsky, Brian Bix,
Yishai Blank, Avihay Dorfman, Vic Goldberg, Jim Gordley, Sharon Hannes, Matthew
Harding, Ron Harris, Robin Kar, Roy Kreitner, Tamar Kricheli‐Katz, Kaiponanea
Matsumura, Menny Mautner, Yifat Naftali, David Schorr, Alan Schwartz, Stephen Smith,
and workshop participants at Tel‐Aviv and Villanova for their helpful comments.
**

For the canonical statement of this “choice theory” approach, see HANOCH DAGAN &
MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACT (2017). For refinements to the
concept of autonomy that bear on specific performance, see Hanoch Dagan & Michael
Heller, Freedom, Choice, and Contracts, 20 THEO. INQ. L. 595 (2019); Hanoch Dagan &
Michael Heller, Why Autonomy Must Be Contract’s Ultimate Value, 20 JERUSALEM REV. LEG.
1
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the choice of remedy – allow people legitimately to recruit others to their future
plans by committing their own future selves in return.

This commitment

necessarily curtails the self‐determination of the promisor’s future self – and it’s
the key to understanding specific performance.
Contract‐keeping is justified because and only to the extent that the claimed
dominion of the present self over the future self can itself be justified. This
seemingly simple proposition encapsulates both the moral premise of the common
law and its challenges. The common law baseline of compensation – and not
specific performance – serves as a stronghold for the autonomy of promisors’
future selves. Covering a promisee’s expectation interest is qualitatively less
imposing on the future self’s self‐determination. Therefore, other things being
equal, contract’s autonomy‐enhancing mission requires that disappointed
promisees should be entitled to damages, rather than specific performance.
The requirement that “other things be equal” must be unpacked. This is
the terrain on which we do the analytic work to delineate specific performance’s
proper boundaries.

Most contracts can achieve their mission of facilitating

promisees’ plans by liquidating breach into money. Where this is true, allowing
the promisor’s current self to encumber her future self with the obligation to
specifically perform, rather than to cover the promise’s value, cannot be justified
by reference to her self‐determination. This means, at least for liberal contract law,
that it cannot be justified, period.
Other things, however, are not always equal. The first challenge therefore
is to identify categories of cases in which liquidating the promisor’s performance
does significantly frustrate contract’s function as a planning tool.

Those

categories, at least a priori, do justify specific performance. For the most part, the
common law correctly identifies these categories. A second, related challenge is
to help parties signal cases in which they consider the contract’s actual
performance significant for their own particular plans, even though their contract
STUD. 148 (2019) [hereinafter Dagan & Heller, Why Autonomy]; Hanoch Dagan & Michael
Heller, Autonomy for Contract, Refined, 38 L. & PHIL. * (2021) [hereinafter Dagan & Heller,
Autonomy Refined]; Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Choice Theory: A Restatement, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 112 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin
Zipursky eds., 2020) [hereinafter Dagan & Heller, Restatement].
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does not fall within the usual categories. Here, the common law falls substantially
short. Parties have a hard time ensuring they will get specific performance when
that’s what they want from their contracts. The third challenge pushes in the
opposite direction. Here, contract law faces categories of cases, notably involving
employment, where specific performance is bound to threaten the self‐
determination of the future self to such a degree that it cannot be justified – even
if excluding such a remedy diminishes contract’s empowering potential.
These three challenges in turn yield three practical takeaways. First, we
show how the so‐called “uniqueness” exception – covering cases in which specific
performance is regularly provided – can and should be refined so it more carefully
tracks its (reconstructed) normative foundation. As a practical matter, this means,
for example, distinguishing in real estate transactions between sales of residential
and commercial property, and between breaches by sellers and buyers. Second,
we criticize the resistance of the common law to parties’ attempts to opt into
specific performance (and to penalty clauses, as we’ll show) to remedy breach of
their contract. One instance where specific performance should be more readily
available is when an employer breaches a promise to continue to employ an
employee. Finally, we highlight what may well be the most challenging normative
question for liberal contract law: how to address cases in which empowering the
current self’s constitutive exercise of self‐authorship threatens self‐determination
of the future self. Non‐compete agreements vividly illustrate the problem that
arises when law overly facilitates the current self’s pursuit of welfarist interests.
We show the path forward.
Let us state our bottom line plainly. From the standpoint of autonomy, (1)
specific performance must not be the default remedy. (2) Specific performance
should nonetheless be available where monetary recovery cannot substantially
avoid the disruption breach causes to a promisee’s plan. (3) Translating #2 into a
workable rule implies that specific performance should be the default if the
promisee is a buyer of a unique good for personal use, paradigmatically, a
personal residence. (4) Because #3 is only a proxy for #2, parties should be able to
opt into specific performance, so long as they do not violate #5. (5) Specific
performance should not be awarded against providers of personal services.
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The dominant economic analysis of specific performance also arrives at
these five principles, raising the question whether our account is just economic
analysis in disguise.

It is not.

Our five principles derive from contract’s

autonomy‐based telos and lead to a distinct reform agenda. In our account, #2 and
#3 are normative defaults. Contra the economists, they do not arise from or depend
upon the current majoritarian preferences of contracting parties (as we discuss in
Part III.B.3 below).2 On #4, relational justice constrains party opt‐in, an autonomy‐
regarding limit missing from the economic account. Finally, #5 yields a mandatory
rule. Contra the economists, it is not contingent on people’s imperfect foresight,
which technology may ameliorate. Taken together, these normative commitments
constitute an autonomy‐enhancing law of specific performance – one that supports
contracting parties as they trade off terms and remedies in the service of their self‐
determination.
Our account suggests a new perspective on specific performance, one that
offers useful legal reforms and highlights new questions that must be addressed if
contract law is to be fully loyal to its liberal commitments. Part II briefly outlines
the existing terrain of specific performance; Part III shows how autonomy,
particularly, the challenge of respecting the future self, unlocks the key to
understanding specific performance.

While this Part has some challenging

jurisprudential material, the payoff comes in Part IV which lays out the doctrinal
and reform takeaways.
We understand our task in this Article as an exercise in charitable
interpretation and reconstruction of the common law. Like other reconstructive
efforts, our reading builds on existing practices, reaffirms much of existing law,
and offers targeted proposals for justified reforms. We do not pretend to divine
the intention of the judges and lawmakers who developed the doctrine we
analyze.

We do not focus on the accidental historical origins of specific

performance in equity courts. Nor do we claim that the common law is, in some
systemic sense, superior to its civil law counterpart – indeed, in another private

On the distinction between normative and majoritarian defaults, see infra Part III.B.3.
See also Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice for Contracts, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435781 [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Justice for Contracts].
2
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law context, we’ve criticized the common law and shown how the civilian
tradition is truer to the law’s liberal commitments.3 In this Article, what we do
offer is an understanding of specific performance firmly grounded in the most
fundamental normative commitments of contract law in a liberal polity. We show
that the common law baseline 4 deserves moral praise – contra the economists’
pragmatic apology and the philosophers’ moral condemnation.5

II. THE STATE OF THE ART IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

We briefly outline the existing terrain of specific performance, first
considering its evolving place in the common law, and then critically reviewing
the sharply conflicting legal economic and philosophical responses. Although the
common law doctrine has been quite stable, its economic advocates have been on
the defense of late. They argue against expanding specific performance primarily
on pragmatic grounds and to respect contractors’ likely preferences ex ante.
Philosophers have the law against them, but more momentum analytically.
Neither side though gets specific performance right because both miss the

See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001)
(celebrating the civil law approach to co‐ownership).
3

As the text clarifies, by “common law baseline” we refer to the doctrinal baseline of the
common law, rather than to its historical baseline.
4

Not all economists advocate for the common law baseline. For example, in an
influential article, Steven Shavell supports the distinction in French contract law between
conveying existing property and producing new goods. See Steven Shavell, Specific
Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84 TEXAS L. REV.
831 (2006). Conversely, not all philosophers condemn the common law. For examples
premised on Hegelian philosophy and Scanlonian contractualism, see respectively
Jennifer Nadler, Contract Damages, Moral Agency, and Henry James’ The Ambassadors, 32
CAN. J.L. & JURISP. 443 (2019); Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 759
(2016). We cannot address these specific philosophical accounts here, but have criticized
them in other contexts elsewhere. See respectively Hanoch Dagan, Liberalism and the Private
Law of Property, 1 CRIT. ANALYSIS L. 268 (2014); Hanoch Dagan, The Value of Choice and the
Justice of Contract, 10 JURISPRUDENCE 422 (2019).
5
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normative underpinnings that justify its legitimacy in the first instance and that
actually drive its direction in a liberal polity.

A. The Common Law in Comparative Perspective
1. The Civil Law Comparison. We start with the civil law tradition, in part
because it offers such a stark contrast to the common law. Both systems agree
contractors are expected to perform their contractual promises, all else equal. In
civil law systems, this truism is understood to suggest that specific performance
will be granted as a matter of course such that courts “literally” order the
breaching party to “complete the contract” thus replicating “the entirety of the
claimant’s threatened right.”6
This approach is indeed the basic principle of modern civil law systems. As
one commentator argues, because “the promisor is obligated to perform his duty
under the contractual obligation,” the promisee has, in the case of breach, “a right
to enforce this duty, while it is possible and conscionable.” Indeed, the claim to
specific performance is regarded in these systems as “the normal remedy,” which
is an “inherent and normal right flowing from a contract.”7
While there are differences, at times significant, among different civil law
jurisdictions,8 what matters for our purposes is their common denominator: “in

For this framing of specific performance, see STEPHEN A. SMITH, RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND
INJUSTICES: THE STRUCTURE OF REMEDIAL LAW 163 (2019). As the Restatement notes, “An
order of specific performance . . . will be so drawn as best to effectuate the purposes for
which the contract was made.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 358(1) (1981).
6

Charles Szladits, The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 208,
212, 217, 221 (1955) (emphasis added).
7

See, e.g., Shael Herman, Specific Performance: A Comparative Analysis (1), 7 EDINBURGH
L. REV. 5 (2003); see also Shavell, supra note 5.
8
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civil‐law systems, the right to performance is asserted to be a fundamental right of
a creditor, emanating from the adagium ʹpacta sunt servandaʹ itself.”9
Common law systems begin from nearly the opposite starting point. There
are again subtleties that somewhat qualify the drama, but Ernst Rabel’s old
description of the gap between these two great traditions as an “abyss” still holds,
by and large. 10 As Stephen Smith recently noted, courts and commentators in
common law jurisdictions “often describe specific performance as a ‘secondary’ or
‘exceptional’ remedy for breach of contract”; and indeed “specific performance is
rarely available for the breach of a contractual duty to provide goods or services,
even where that duty remains alive.”11
This stark doctrinal difference between common and civil law systems
appears to be eroding, however, at least in certain practice areas.12 Convergence
in practice is not surprising given the shared liberal commitments of both legal

Gerard De Vries, Right to Specific Performance: Is There a Divergence between Civil and
Common‐Law Systems, and If So, How Has It Been Bridged in the DCFR, 17 EUR. REV. PRIVATE
L. 581, 582 (2009).
9

Ernst Rabel, A Draft of an International Law of Sales, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 543, 559 (1938).
See also, e.g., John P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV.
495, 538 (1959).
10

SMITH, supra note 6, at 164‐65. See also, e.g., EDWARD YORIO & STEVEN THEL, CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS § 2.4, at 2‐12 (2nd ed. 2011 &
Supp. 2020); Mindy Chen Wishart, Specific Performance and Change of Mind, in COMMERCIAL
REMEDIES 98, 108 (Graham Virgo & Sarah Worthington eds., 2017). Smith claims,
however, that “it is misleading to describe specific performance as secondary or
exceptional,” since “one of the most common private law remedies – an order for a sum
due – is in substance, even if not in name, specific performance.” SMITH, Id. at 164. Our
account of specific performance better explains the difference between these two types of
orders. The difference is not in name only; quite the contrary. The gap between the rarity
of specific performance orders and the prevalence of orders for the sum due vindicates
our thesis: what accounts for the former phenomenon is its unique effect on the autonomy
of our future selves, an effect that is substantially absent from orders for the sum due. See
also Chen Wishart, id., at 125.
11

See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Damages Versus Specific Performance:
Lessons from Commercial Contracts, 12 J. EMPIR. L. STUD. 29, 38‐41 (2015) (collecting sources).
12
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families and the overlapping commercial ties among contracting parties across the
legal divide.
2.

The Common Law Baseline.

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts

declares that after a contract has been breached, the injured party is entitled to
damages as a matter of right. Even if the breach creates no loss, the injured party
will still be awarded nominal damages.13 By contrast, specific performance, as the
Restatement notes, is “granted in the discretion of the court,” and it “will not be
ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the
injured party.”14 The Restatement’s list of “factors affecting adequacy of damages”
may lead to the impression that the availability of specific performance is, or at
least may be, relatively wide.15 But as commentators have repeatedly noted, the
main exception to the baseline rule of no specific performance involves sales of
unique goods or land.16
The Uniform Commercial Code sought to expand this exception, allowing
that specific performance may be decreed both “where the goods are unique,” and
“in other proper circumstances.”17 Importantly, the UCC has added output and

13

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357(1) & 359(1). Further, while specific
performance “will not be refused merely because there is a remedy for breach other than
damages,” such a remedy may be considered as a factor in the court’s discretion. Id. at §
359(3).
14

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (referring to “(a) the difficulty of
proving damages with reasonable certainty, (b) the difficulty of procuring a suitable
substitute performance by means of money awarded as damages, and (c) the likelihood
that an award of damages could not be collected”). The Restatement further adds that
specific performance will be refused if such relief “would cause unreasonable hardship or
loss to the party in breach or to third persons” as well as “if the character and magnitude
of the performance would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or supervision
that are disproportionate to the advantages to be gained from enforcement and to the
harm to be suffered from its denial.” Id., at §§ 364(1)(b) & 366.
15

16

See, e.g., 5 ARTHUR CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1142 (1960); SMITH, supra note 6, at 168.

17

U.C.C. § 2‐716. See also id., at cmt. 2.
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requirement contracts as categories for which specific performance is available.18
Beyond that, though, the UCC has had little practical effect. The Code vaguely
notes that the uniqueness test is to be determined by “the total situation which
characterizes the contract”19 and adds that the category of unique goods includes
“property which is not readily obtainable due to scarcity.”20 While most courts do
read the UCC’s language as indicating the Code’s relatively “liberal attitude”21
toward specific performance, this liberalization by and large does not depart from
the common law’s parameters.22
The final component of the common law doctrine – one that is shared by its
civil law counterpart 23 – involves employment contracts. As the Restatement
categorically states, “A promise to render personal service will not be specifically
enforced.”24 Furthermore, to ensure that contracts of this type are not being de facto
specifically enforced, the Restatement adds that “A promise to render personal
service exclusively for one employer will not be enforced by an injunction against
serving another if its probable result will be to compel a performance involving
See also, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 442‐443 (S.D.
Fla. 1975).
18

19

U.C.C. § 2‐716 cmt. 2.

Cumbest v. Harris, 363 So. 2d 294, 297 (Miss. 1978). See also, e.g., Sedmak v. Charlie’s
Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Mo. App. 1981); Chadwell v. English, 652 P.2d 310,
314 (Okla. App. 1982); King Aircraft Sales v. Lane, 68 Wash. App. 706, 714, 717 (1993). Cf.
Stephan’s Machine & Tool, Inc. v. D & H Machinery Consultants, Inc., 65 Ohio App. 2d
197, 201 (1979) (“The financial circumstances of plaintiff were such that it is folly to
contend that plaintiff could have avoided his business losses by buying a comparable
boring machine from a source other than the defendant”).
20

Ruddock v. First Nat’l Bank, 201 Ill. App. 3d 907, 914, 916 (1990). See also, e.g., Kaiser
Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923, 932‐933 (N.D. Cal.
1970); Tower City Grain Co. v. Richman, 232 N.W.2d 61, 66 (N.D. 1975). Other courts, as
the text implies, do not take to heart the Code’s additional language. See, e.g., Bander v.
Grossman, 161 Misc. 2d 119, 123‐125 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); Scholl v. Hartzell, 1981 Pa. Dist.
& Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 303 at 1, 6‐7; Klein v. PepsiCo, Inc., 845 F.2d 76, 80 (4th Cir. 1988).
21

22

See U.C.C. § 2‐716 cmt. 1.

23

See, e.g., Szladits, supra note 7, at 226.

24

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1).
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personal relations the enforced continuance of which is undesirable or will be to
leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a living.”25

B. The Best Economic Account and Its Limits
One of the hallmarks of contract theory is its practitioners’ long‐standing
fascination regarding the proper scope of specific performance. The story of the
moves and counter‐moves of judges and legal academics offering arguments for
and against the common law baseline is rich and at times complex. Fortunately,
its elaboration is unnecessary for our current task. What is needed, rather, is to
consider critically the state of the art.
This section and the next present the most powerful critiques and defenses
of specific performance. On one side, we have Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous
dictum that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it, and nothing else.”26 To illustrate the
opposing view, we can look to Seana Shiffrin’s proposition that “a commitment to
perform, morally, entails a commitment to perform rather than a commitment to
perform or pay.” 27 Criticizing each position on its own terms is important in
setting the scene for our autonomy‐enhancing approach.
1. The Winding Path to Joint Maximization. We begin with the modern
Holmesian position, which has been carried forward by economic analysts of the
law. Almost fifty years ago, Richard Posner started propagating the idea that the
common law’s baseline is justified by reference to its salutary overall efficiency
effects. Limiting a promisee’s remedy to expectation damages (the monetary loss
of expected profit), he wrote, generates “an incentive to commit a breach” when
profit from breach exceeds “the expected profit to the other party from completion
25

Id., at § 367(2).

26

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).

Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1551
(2009); see also, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2
(1989).
27

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Dagan & Heller

Page 11

of the contract” – and this, he added, is exactly what a welfare‐maximizing law
should do.28
More recently, however, economic theorists have rejected this first‐
generation law‐and‐economics theory of efficient breach, labeling it “vacuous” to
aim at the common law’s overall efficiency. 29

Instead, they emphasize the

incompleteness of contracts, and then base the choice of the default remedy on an
assessment of what the parties would likely have wanted. The relevant question
under this approach is whether specific performance would be the remedy of
choice for the majority of contracting parties, or – in a slightly different
formulation

30

– whether it properly reflects (and exhausts) the respective

obligations the parties can reasonably be deemed to have undertaken.31 The most
persuasive economic defense of the common law doctrine of specific performance,
in our view, follows exactly this path. It combines two insights – one from
Anthony Kronman, the other from Robert Scott and Jody Kraus.32
The New York Court of Appeals embraced Kronman’s argument in one of
the most famous specific performance cases.33 Kronman begins with the difficulty
of making sense of the uniqueness test given that “every good has substitutes,
even if only very poor ones.” The key for understanding why uniqueness is
nonetheless a proper legal test, Kronman argues, lies in how it testifies to “the
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (1st ed. 1972). Posner was not the
first to introduce this analysis. See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage
Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).
28

See, e.g., Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses
of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1944 (2011).
29

The text implicitly assumes a (conceptual and normative) continuity between
contractual terms and contract remedies. For a defense of this assumption, see infra text
accompanying notes 123‐124.
30

31

See, e.g., Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1948.

Because our aim here is to outline the most powerful economic defense of the common
law, we leave aside influential economic analysts such as Steven Shavell, who advocates
for an approach like in French law distinguishing between producing new goods and
conveying already‐existing ones. See Shavell, supra note 5.
32

33

See Van Wagner Adv. Corp. v S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 759‐60 (N.Y. 1986).
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volume, refinement, and reliability of the available information about substitutes
for the subject matter of the breached contract.” As he explains, when a court
asserts “that the subject matter of a particular contract is unique and has no
established market value,” it is “really saying that it cannot obtain, at reasonable
cost, enough information about substitutes to permit it to calculate an award of
money

damages

without

imposing

an

unacceptably

high

risk

of

undercompensation on the injured promisee.” Uniqueness, in other words, turns
out to be a test that can help courts distinguish between cases in which there is a
well‐developed, thick market for substitutes and ones in which the relevant
market is imperfect or thin.34
The next step of the argument is to show that most contracting parties –
“were they free to make their own rules concerning remedies for breach and had
they deliberated about the matter at the time of contracting” – would indeed draw
this line between specific performance and money damages.35 Scott and Kraus
provide this link.
“Once a regret contingency has occurred,” they claim, the promisor faces a
choice between two principal options – “perform and lose” and “breach and pay”
– and is thus “motivated to choose the least costly option.” If both parties are able
to acquire substitute goods on the same terms, then promisors are likely to
perform, all else equal. Why? Because breach would entail not only liability in
the promisee’s expectation, but also “bad feelings, loss of business reputation,
good will, etc.” Other things are not always equal, however. Thus, where the
promisor has a reason to believe that the promisee “is better able to cover in the
market and thus reduce [her] anticipated losses on the contract,” she is likely to
choose the option of breach. This “‘benign’ vision of breaching behavior,” Scott
and Kraus conclude, conceptualizes breach as a “cry for help” by the promisor: a
request for the promisee “to salvage the broken contract at least cost and to send
[her] the damage bill.”

34

Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 359, 362‐63 (1978).

Id. at 365. Kronman’s own account of this step, which is based on a calculus of
renegotiation costs, has been convincingly criticized. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S.
KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 114 (5th ed., 2013).
35
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A regime in which specific performance is granted as a matter of course –
even in a thick market where substitute goods are readily available – “invites” an
opportunistic response by the promisee. By limiting the availability of specific
performance to cases of a thin market, the common law preempts such a response
and thereby minimizes the parties’ costs of regretted contracts. This means that
the common law reduces the ex ante cost of the parties’ contracts and increases the
size of the pie for both – exactly what most contracting parties would likely want
contract law to require.36
2. The Built‐In Limits of Welfarist Analysis. This is a subtle and (in our view)
convincing argument. Yet, it is important to clarify the limits of its power and
indeed of its ambition. First, this account does not purport to offer a normative
case for the common law position.

Rather, it operates within the canonical

economic view in which contract law’s gap‐filling apparatus in its entirety is
understood in majoritarian terms. The raison d’être of this understanding is
familiar: writing contracts is costly, so setting up rules that mimic the preferences
of most contracting parties minimizes transaction costs and thus maximizes the
contractual pie.
The second limitation emerges from the empirical premise of the argument:
the distinction between thick and thin markets. This distinction is indeed critical
for the dynamics of contract performance, and economic analysts are therefore
correct to study its implications and the proper response of an attentive contract
law.

But it is worthwhile recalling that this account relies on Kronman’s

observation regarding the dramatic differences between “the volume, refinement,
and reliability of the available information about substitutes” 37 for the subject
matter of different types of contract. This means that changes in technology may
affect these differences. Some changes may even overturn the analysis outright.
When Kronman first put the spotlight (more than four decades ago) on how
the distinction between thick and thin markets affects the law of specific
performance, the contingency of the distinction was not that important. But now

36

SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 35, at 114‐15.

37

Kronman, supra note 34, at 362.
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Big data and algorithmic processing increasingly make

individual preferences computable. 38 In turn, this means that the economic
argument for the common law of specific performance is by its nature contingent
rather than principled – unlike our approach set out in Part III.
For economists, contract remedies – nominal, restitution, reliance,
expectation, super‐compensatory damages and specific performance (and
everything in between) – all lie on a single spectrum, differing only in their
distinctive ex ante and ex post cost and benefits. In this view, which we reject, there
is no difference between specific performance and liquidated damages large
enough to be considered penalties. That courts draw a line between money
damages and specific performance has no particular moral valence. It simply
reflects contingent differences in the predicted cost structure of each remedy.39
But this contingent quality of the economists’ position has practical
consequences: it limits their ability to respond to the philosophers’ challenge. By
linking restrictions on specific performance to majoritarian preferences, the
economist friends of the common law can only deflect the civil‐law‐cum‐moralist
challenge. If majoritarian preferences shift, then the common law approach loses
its justification. The economists do not, and cannot, contest the normative power
of the moralist critique.40

For the implications of this phenomenon on the economic understanding of market
mechanisms, and more specifically contract, see Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare,
Autonomy, and The Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1289, 1297‐1300 (2019); Dagan & Heller,
Why Autonomy, supra note 1, at 158‐59; see also Przemyslaw Palka, Algorithmic Central
Planning: Between Efficiency and Freedom, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (2020).
38

The contingency of economic accounting is well demonstrated by the detailed
analysis of the (mirroring) costs and benefits of damages and injunctions in Judge Posner’s
opinion in Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992).
39

For perhaps the most sustained efforts by economists to contest the philosophers’
critique, see Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,
88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989) and Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral
Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, MICH. L. REV. 1569 (2009), replying to Shiffrin, supra
note 27. Craswell’s article persuasively shows the irrelevance of then‐existing autonomy‐
based theories, but does not speak to more powerful, still‐flawed, later accounts such as
Shiffrin’s that aimed to improve on Charles Fried’s version and to rebut Craswell’s.
40
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C. The Most Adamant Critique and Its Pitfalls
To illustrate the moralist critique of the common law, we focus on Shiffrin’s
influential account – an approach that shares the same deontological normative
structure and crucial pitfalls as the other dominant consent and transfer contract
theories.41
1. Contract and Promise. Shiffrin argues that existing specific performance
doctrine epitomizes the common law’s moral bankruptcy. To get there, she starts
from what she calls the troubling “divergence of contract and promise.” The
morality of promises, Shiffrin argues, implies that “a promisor is morally expected
to keep her promise through performance,” and that only “if, for good reason,
what was promised became impossible, or very difficult, to perform,” might
financial substitutes be appropriate. “Otherwise, intentional, and often even
negligent, failure to perform appropriately elicits moral disapprobation.”
Promissory morality can be satisfied only by “the consent of the promisee,” and
not by supplying “the financial equivalent of what was promised.”42
Under this account, when breach occurs, it generally requires not
expectation damages, but specific performance (and at times punitive damages).

Shavell’s exchange with Shiffrin is also off‐point: his criticisms there do not reach to the
account we develop in Part III, below. We explore this debate in more detail in DAGAN &
HELLER, CHOICE THEORY, supra note 1, chapters 3 and 4.
Because we have demonstrated these points in detail elsewhere for contract law as a
whole, here we focus on the aspects tied to specific performance. Note also, there are
dissenting views that seek to accommodate the common law approach to specific
performance with transfer theory, but we find them unconvincing. See Hanoch Dagan,
Two Visions of Contract, 119 MICH. L. REV. * (2020). And conversely, there are efforts to
justify the morality of the common law view, premised on Hegelian philosophy and
Scanlonian contractualism. Our responses to these approaches lie outside the scope of
this Article. See supra note 5 (citing these approaches and our critiques).
41

Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708,
722 (2007). Cf. Lionel Smith, Understanding Specific Performance, in COMPARATIVE REMEDIES
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 221, 233 (Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick eds., 2005).
42
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Shiffrin concedes that in some cases there may be “distinctively law‐regarding
grounds,” such as “the difficulties of judicial supervision, risks of arbitrary
enforcement, and in some cases, the hazards of involuntary servitude,” which
could justify “reluctance to order specific performance.” But these discrete reasons
are local and they do not, and indeed cannot, “question the general proposition
that specific performance is the appropriate moral response to breach.” Nor do
they justify the mitigation doctrine, which “places the burden on the promisee to
make positive efforts to find alternative providers instead of presumptively
locating that burden fully on the breaching promisor.” Because existing doctrine
“fails to use its distinctive powers and modes of expression to mark the judgment
that breach is impermissible as opposed to merely subject to a price,” the common
law’s treatment of transgressions, Shiffrin concludes, is indefensible.43
Shiffrin is not impressed by the economists’ account in which majoritarian
logic drives what may constitute a breach and what should be the proper remedial
response. Even if it were justified to allow rational actors, who care only about
profit‐maximizing, to opt into a regime that compromises “the moral significance
of a broken promise,” contract law must not embrace this position in its doctrine.
By re‐ (or rather mis‐) presenting efficient breach as part of the parties’ contract,
the economists’ account (like the common law that it seeks to justify) robs contract
of its moral foundation. “Part of the underlying value of promises is that promises
transfer, rather than hoard, discretionary power. The ‘perform or pay’ promise,
however, retains a good portion of that discretion.” This makes the common law
vision of a promise “shabby and second‐rate.” Encoding this vision in the law –
encouraging promisors “to make only this thinnest of commitments” – cannot
possibly be conducive to a proper “moral culture.”44
2. The Transfer Theory Core, and Why It’s Wrong. The key to Shiffrin’s moral
condemnation of the common law, and the core of our critique, lies in
understanding her heavy reliance on the “transfer theory of contract” – spelled out
in the italicized text in the previous paragraph. Following a tradition that goes

43

Shiffrin, supra note 42, at 710, 724, 733; Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 1586.

Shiffrin, supra note 42, at 729; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean What You Think I
Should Have Said, 98 VA. L. REV. 159, 175‐76 (2012).
44

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Dagan & Heller

Page 17

back to Kant and Hegel, Shiffrin analyzes “the moral structure of promise” as a
“transfer[] of decision‐making power.” The binary transfer of authority explains,
in this view, the “bindingness” of promises and the wrongfulness of breaking a
promise: “By promising to φ, the promisor transfers his or her right to act
otherwise to the promisee. To not φ, then, is to act in a way the promisor has no
right to do, and to φ is to act in a way the promisee has a right that she (the
promisor) do.” Thus, “[i]n light of this transfer, the promisee has the right to
expect (and often demand) performance and has the concomitant power to use her
transferred power or decision to waive or excuse the promisor’s obligation of
performance.”45
In other words, as Peter Benson recently explained, for transfer theory,
contract is “a form of transactional acquisition – a transfer of ownership between
the parties – that is contractually specified and complete at [] formation.”
Formation of contract in this vision is a “representational medium of mutual
promises,” through which each party moves “a substantive content” from her
“rightful exclusive control” to the other’s control.

This means that the

performance of a contract is of no normative significance: it merely delivers to the
promisee’s factual possession what was rightfully hers already. This is why for
transfer theory a failure to perform must be understood “as an interference with
the plaintiff’s exclusive right,” which implies, as Shiffrin’s analysis assumes, a
“striking parallel” between breach of contract and conversion.46
Transfer theory, however, is deeply flawed, because it misses the nature
and the point of contract, which is at core a power‐conferring body of law (as we’ve

Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Are Contracts Promises?, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 241, 242‐44 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012); Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 517 (2008).
45

PETER BENSON, JUSTICE IN TRANSACTIONS: A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 24, 41, 247,
321, 359 (2019). See also, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Kantian Perspectives on Private Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEW PRIVATE LAW 67, * (Andrew Gold et al. eds., 2020) (A contract
right “gives one person the entitlement to have another person’s action available for the
first person’s purposes . . . it is one person’s entitlement to determine (that is demand or
compel) a particular action from another.”).
46
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argued in detail elsewhere).47 Contract attaches legal consequences to certain acts
thus enabling people to affect their entitlements, if they so desire. This power‐
conferring aspect is what makes contract law dramatically different from tort law.
Tort law doctrines, at least those dealing with our bodily integrity, are duty‐
imposing. Assuming people have certain pre‐legal and pre‐conventional rights,
tort law affirms the correlative duties against their violation. But contract law is
different: rather than vindicating existing rights, contract law first and foremost
confers the power to create new rights, rights that are crucial to people’s
autonomy, as we will soon show.
Duties not to interfere with people’s rights are surely relevant to contract
law. But they are secondary. Duty‐imposing rules that safeguard contracts’
voluntariness (dealing for example with duress, fraud and the like) would be
meaningless in the absence of (power‐conferring) contracts: the duties’ role is to
protect our ability to apply the powers enabled by contract, and they would be
pointless in a world that did not recognize the power to contract. This means that
– in sharp contrast to torts – the relevant question for a liberal theory of contract is
not “what constraints to people’s autonomy are legitimate,” but rather “how
should contract law enhance people’s autonomy.”
By dogmatically asserting that a contract necessarily needs to take the form
of a complete assignment to the promisee of the right to the promisor’s future
actions – by perceiving any qualification as at least prima facie unwarranted
hoarding of discretionary powers, in Shiffrin’s terms – transfer theory obscures
this crucial question. It thus fails to consider the ways in which law can facilitate
forms of bilateral voluntary obligations that are conducive to contract’s autonomy‐
enhancing telos.48

The remainder of this section heavily draws on DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 1, at 36‐
40; Dagan & Heller, Autonomy Refined, supra note 1, at *.
47

Thus, in presupposing that contract must necessarily fit the pattern of a one‐shot
reassignment of future entitlements and risks, transfer theory is unable to account for
many contract types that go beyond this limiting barter‐like pattern. In these types, a
party’s current self obligates her future self to cooperate with the other party, which
inevitably creates the intra‐personal dilemmas that doctrines like specific performance
address.
48

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336

Dagan & Heller

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Page 19

This inquiry, to which we now turn, is not quantitative – it is not about
maximizing the amount of autonomy in the world.

But it is teleological

nonetheless. Contract is not worth keeping in and of itself. Rather, its value
derives from its contribution to our autonomy which is valued for its own sake.
So, we are looking for specific performance rules that are as conducive as possible
to people’s autonomy – rules that generate the most autonomy‐friendly
implications.

III. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND THE FUTURE SELF
The familiar debate on specific performance points to two troubling
conclusions. First, the problem with the moralist critics of the common law – and
their implied normative defense of the civil law49 – is not their moralism. Their
mistake lies instead in misstating the underlying morality of contract and indeed
of promise. 50 But we cannot overcome this failure, dramatic though it is, by
resorting to the economists’ defense of the common law. Hence, our second
conclusion: even the best economic account does not provide a principled
normative justification for the limits of specific performance. Nor does it purport
to provide such a justification. The economists’ account is contingent on mere
computational difficulties that technology may be able to overcome. And their
view is founded on the presumed preferences of (certain type of) contractors,
rather than on the moral virtue of the position they seek to vindicate.
It is time to start afresh. This Part shows how a thoroughgoing commitment
to autonomy explains and justifies much of the current law of specific
performance, charitably understood.

49

See supra text accompanying note 9.

A recent study shows that, as an empirical matter, most people do not perceive as
immoral breach of contract followed by compensation to the promisee. See Sergio
Mittlaender, Morality, Compensation, and the Contractual Obligation, 16 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD.
119 (2019).
50
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A. Autonomy in Contract51
1. The Moral Virtue of Expectation Damages. Contract is not a transfer – at
least not in the sense the philosophers require for their approach to cohere. 52
Rather, it is a plan co‐authored by the parties in the service of their respective goals;
a joint undertaking of a cooperative arrangement. Contract’s significance lies in
its service to planning since the capacity to plan is what makes a person an agent,
rather than a mere object of powers, effects, and circumstances. To be sure, much
of what happens to us is beyond our control – it derives from our natural and social
endowments as well as life’s vicissitudes. But contract is exactly the instrument
that expands the scope of what we can and do have control over.

Law’s

justification for enforcing the parties’ agreement is accordingly grounded in its
commitment to enhance their self‐determination, and both its animating principles
and its operative doctrines are guided by this autonomy‐enhancing mission.
Thinking about contract in these terms implies that formation is not the only
normatively relevant moment in the life of a contract – as transfer theorists posit.
Rather, viewing contract as a co‐authored plan reinstates the full significance of
contract’s intertemporal dimension. Focusing on the times of contract brings to light
the core achievement of contract – the prevalence of expectation damages, which
makes it so vital to planning – and highlights its central challenge – that is,
showing proper respect for the autonomy of the contractors’ future selves.
Contract is the means through which we can legitimately enlist others to
our own goals, purposes, and projects – both material and social. By ensuring the
reliability of contractual promises for future performance, contract law enables
people to join forces in their respective plans into the future. An enforceable
agreement is the parties’ script for this co‐operative endeavor, and contract law

This section heavily draws on DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 1; Dagan & Heller,
Restatement, supra note 1; Dagan, supra note 41.
51

For those interested in the jurisprudential heavy lifting that nails down our refutation
of consent and transfer theories, unpacks its implications, and responds to critics, see
DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 1, at 19‐47; Dagan & Heller, Autonomy Refined, supra note 1.
52
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provides them with the indispensable infrastructure that both facilitates this risky
venture and ensures its integrity.
This account explains why vindicating the promisee’s expectation interest
is contract’s signature commitment. The ability to develop protected expectations
is what makes contract a crucial tool for planning and thus for self‐determination.
Therefore, a contractual right is the right to expect. 53 Contract’s autonomy‐
enhancing services admittedly impose on promisors an extra burden: an exposure
to liability that goes beyond other people’s actual harm. Promisees’ claims are not
capped by their actual reliance. But this burden is quite modest – it only requires
putative promisors to apply some additional caution while making promises – and
it falls squarely within the obligation of reciprocal respect for self‐determination
that underlies private law as a whole.54
Our core claim is that contract is both justified and best interpreted by
reference to this autonomy‐enhancing telos. Contract is, as Charles Fried argues,
“a kind of moral invention” exactly because it extends people’s reach in this way.55
By expanding the available repertoire of secure interpersonal commitments
beyond the realm of close‐knit interactions, contract law dramatically augments
people’s ability to plan. In offering that, contract makes a crucial contribution to
The law in action is admittedly often different: at times, parties waive this right and in
other cases they resort to non‐legal sanctions for its vindication. But this observation does
not negate the significance of the legal right to expect. Rather, it points to the way the right
often functions in the background, rather at the foreground, of social life. See SCOTT &
KRAUS, supra note 35, at 594. Cf. Dagan & Heller, supra note 3, at 577‐81.
53

This last proposition is not self‐evident. One of us has defended it at some detail in
work co‐authored with Avihay Dorfman. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman,
Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (2016) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Just
Relationships]; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, The Domain of Private Law, * U. TORONTO
L.J. * (2021); Dagan & Dorfman, Justice for Contracts, supra note 2, at *. See also HANOCH
DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 114‐47 (2020); Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy,
Relational Justice, and Restitution, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND
RESTITUTION 219 (Elise Bant et al. eds., 2020) [hereinafter Dagan, Restitution]; Avihay
Dorfman, The Relational Justice of Torts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY,
supra note 1, at 321.
54

Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT 17, 20 (Gregory Klass et. al eds., 2014).
55
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our autonomy because self‐determination involves planning. People, to be sure,
may change their plans, and autonomous persons must be entitled to do so. But
having a set of plans arranged in a temporal sequence is typically key to the ability
to carry out higher‐order projects, that is, to self‐determine.
2. Why Choice Matters. This conception of contract entails three principles
– addressing range, limit, and floor – that must guide contract law in a liberal
society: (1) Law should proactively facilitate the availability and viability of multiple
contract types in each sphere of human endeavor. (2) Contract law must respect
the autonomy of a party’s future self, that is, it must take seriously the ability to re‐
write the story of one’s life. And, (3) to justify coercive enforcement by the state,
all contracts must comply with the demands of relational justice.
We unpack these three principles over the course of a book and many
articles that together set out “choice theory” – and explain the jurisprudential
structure of contract law as a whole. The core rules governing the life of contracts,
from inception to breakdown, all follow the three principles of choice theory
because all partake in the same autonomy‐enhancing mission. Here we limit our
discussion to just two pages summarizing the first and third principles for readers
unfamiliar with the major findings of choice theory. Then we turn our focus to the
second principle, concerning the future self. This is the principle that most directly
grounds our account of the common law doctrine of specific performance.
The first principle, of proactive facilitation, manifests in the numerous
contract doctrines that go beyond safeguarding the parties’ independence. These
doctrines seek to empower people by expanding the scope of co‐operative
engagements available to advance the parties’ future plans.

A foundational

example here is the canonical status of the “objective” approach to party intention
that guides the rules on contract formation. This approach is best explained by the
qualitative difference between the limited autonomy‐enhancing potential of a
subjective theory of contract and the far more impressive potential of its objective
counterpart. But the objective theory is only the tip of the iceberg: many other
doctrinal features of modern contract law follow suit.
Perhaps the most powerful example of the significant facilitative role of
modern contract law is its extensive gap‐filling apparatus. This apparatus sharply
departs from the traditional common law reluctance to enforce incomplete
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Contemporary contract law is not satisfied with providing

enforcement services only to parties who fully specify the terms of their
engagement. Rather, it goes out of its way to facilitate transactions by offering
defaults that can fill gaps – even regarding crucial aspects of a transaction, such as
price. A significant subset of the current contract law canon belongs to this
category – including most rules dealing with performance and breach.56 The same
concern for proactive facilitation underlies contract law’s characteristic supply of
a variety of contract types. When properly implemented, these types generate an
inventory of diverse frameworks for interpersonal interaction for people to choose
from in each major sphere of contracting.57
The third animating principle of choice theory shifts gears to the inter‐
personal dimension of contracting. Contract law requires attention to relational
justice – that is, to reciprocal respect for self‐determination. This obligation arises
from people’s foundational right of self‐determination, the same right that
underlies the legitimacy of contract in the first instance. Therefore, when someone
relies on contract law, that party is also necessarily – inescapably – undertaking the
obligation to respect the other party’s self‐determination.
This principle has important consequences for the structure of contract law.
In particular, it means that when people use contract law’s empowering potential,
their uses should be limited to interactions that show reciprocal respect for self‐
determination. This obligation of respect cannot be too onerous, but neither is it
limited to a negative duty of non‐interference – as some philosophical accounts
have mistakenly suggested.

Consider contract law’s careful, but important,

deviations from the laissez faire mode of regulating the parties’ bargaining process.
For example, note the expansion of the law of fraud beyond the traditional
categories of misrepresentation and concealment to include affirmative duties of
disclosure. Also, note modern rules dealing with unilateral mistake, duress, anti‐

See Hanoch Dagan, Types of Contracts and Law’s Autonomy‐Enhancing Role, 5 EUR.
CONTRACT L. & THEORY 109 (2021).
56

See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 1, at 65‐137. Indeed, our initial work in developing
choice theory focused squarely on the essential, and previously overlooked, role of types
in contract law.
57
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price‐gouging, and unconscionability. Concern for relational justice also best
explains key rules during the life of a contract, as epitomized by the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. This duty, now read into every contract, protects the parties
against the heightened interpersonal vulnerability that contract performance
engenders and solidifies a conception of contract as a cooperative venture.58
Now, we shift from autonomy’s inter‐personal demands to intra‐personal
ones. And this circles us back to choice theory’s second animating principle, the
one that matters most for our purposes, concerning the autonomy of a party’s future
self.

This principle of regard for the future self focuses on what autonomy

demands within each person across time, that is, intra‐personally and inter‐
temporally. In simple terms, what are the limits of the legitimate dominion of my
current self over my future self? How much and how far can one’s current self
legitimately commit her future self?

B. The Current and Future Self59
1. The Freedom to Change Your Mind. Self‐determination requires that people
have the right to write the story of their lives. As Michael Bratman explains,
people are planning agents and planning agency implies that people’s “prior
intentions provide a rational default for present deliberation.” 60 A liberal law
necessarily follows suit. It offers people the normative power to make contractual
commitments, and it properly assumes that insofar as these commitments are
indeed part of the current self’s plan, the future self is presumed to adhere to them.
Thus, contract law takes seriously the voluntary commitments individuals

For a detailed defense, both normative and positive, of the role of relational justice in
contract law, see Dagan & Dorfman, Justice for Contracts, supra note 54.
58

This section heavily draws on DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 1; Dagan & Heller,
Restatement, supra note 1; Dagan, supra note 41, at *.
59

See Michael E. Bratman, Time, Rationality, and Self‐Governance, 22 PHIL. ISSUES 73, 74
(2012) (planning agency implies “diachronic rationality constraints”).
60
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undertake: it requires them to make good on their promises and is not moved by
sheer regret following bad choices.61
This means that self‐determination necessarily entails some authority of a
person’s current self over her future self. But this authority must not be boundless.
To see why, recall that self‐determination also requires that people have the right
to re‐write the story of their lives. The inter‐temporal constancy that planning
agency requires needs to be, in other words, sensitive to the fact that “sometimes
an agent supposes there are conclusive reasons for change.” While new “ordinary
desires and preferences” may not suffice, the constancy that planning agency
implies should nonetheless be “defeasible constancy: constancy in the absence of
supposed conclusive reason for an alternative.”62
This is why a liberal legal regime – one that offers people the normative
power to make contractual commitments so as to enhance their autonomy – cannot
fully ignore the impact of such contracts on the parties’ future selves. It is true that
enhancing people’s autonomy in their capacity as promisees requires, as noted,
vindicating their expectations (and not only reliance).

But respecting their

autonomy in their capacity as promisors also implies that contract law must be
careful in defining the scope of the obligations it enforces and in circumscribing
their implications. Why? Law must allow some space for the defeasibility of inter‐
temporal constancy. In other words, people sometimes must be free to change
their minds.
A liberal contract law, beyond enabling us to make credible commitments,
should always be alert to its potentially detrimental implications for the autonomy
of the parties’ future selves.

Accordingly, choice theory’s second principle

requires that the same law that empowers people with the ability credibly to
commit themselves through contracts, cannot ignore the impact of these contracts
on their future selves. In a genuinely liberal legal regime, contract’s invaluable

Such cases of regret should be carefully distinguished from cases in which the parties
were mistaken regarding the basic assumptions on which their contracts were based. See
Hanoch Dagan & Ohad Somech, When Contract’s Basic Assumptions Fail, * CANADIAN J.L.
& JURIS. * (2021).
61

62

Bratman, supra note 60, at 82.
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empowerment service must not end up as a carte blanche for allowing people’s
current self to fully dominate their future selves.
This prescription of respecting autonomy of the promisor’s future self does
not make a sham of the canonical doctrinal obligation to perform a contractual
promise; neither does it imply a Holmesian disjunctive duty to perform or pay. As
we noted early on, promisees are entitled to nominal damages even if breach
creates no loss – a rule reflecting this interpersonal obligation. But law also
recognizes that the obligation is not absolute.

It must accommodate the

defeasibility of agents’ inter‐temporal constancy because the obligation to perform
is itself premised on contract’s autonomy‐enhancing telos. This is why specific
performance is not readily available in cases where expectation damages do not
significantly disrupt the contractual script. In these circumstances, as we explain
below, the promisor’s change of mind justifiably excuses the duty to specifically
perform.63
This concern for the autonomy of promisors’ future selves,64 as we frame it,
should be carefully distinguished from two competing ways of investigating the
implications of the time dimension of contract.
First, our account does not rely on people’s imperfect foresight.65 While we
do not deny the relevance of systemic behavioral limitations to contract law, we
think that reliance on such imperfections can neither explain nor justify contract
doctrine. As a matter of positive law, the claim that imperfect foresight limits the
power to bind is over‐inclusive, because it also covers many cases of mistaken
Exiting a relationship admittedly affects values other than autonomy, notably
community and efficiency. But for a genuinely liberal contract law, these values are either
constitutive of or instrumental to autonomy, which is contract’s ultimate value. This
means that, but for the most extreme cases, autonomy enjoys a lexical priority. See DAGAN
& HELLER, supra note 1, at 84‐85.
63

Being a limit on people’s legitimate jurisdiction to undertake future commitments,
this principle focuses on promisors, rather than promisees, as the text emphasizes.
Oftentimes, of course, each contractor is both a promisor and a promise, which means that
the principle does apply to both, but then it applies to each in her capacity as a promisor.
64

See, e.g., Susan Rose‐Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 937‐41 (1985).
65

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336

Dagan & Heller

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Page 27

judgment (such as a bad gamble) that contract law does not hesitate to enforce.
Further, and more fundamentally, our normative claim is that even if behavioral
limitations were to be completely eliminated – say, through new technology or
legal techniques – liberal contract law would not, or at least should not, authorize
the current self’s complete domination of the future self.
Second, choice theory’s concern for the future self does not imply an
endorsement of the idea of “multiple selves,”

66

that is, the idea of the

disintegration of the self. Quite the contrary. Choice theory rejects this position.
Indeed, its core claim regarding the significance of planning to self‐determination
implies that the current self and the future self are the same self. The integrity of
the self, rather than its separation into different selves, is what drives choice
theory’s justification for contract enforcement, and is thus a necessary feature of
its account of the telos of contract. The discussion of the future self is a discussion
of the self in the future and the liberal requirement that it be able to rewrite its
course.
2. The Line‐Drawing Challenge. Because any act of self‐authorship constrains
the future self, the obligation of the liberal state to enhance autonomy implies that
contract law must both bolster and limit people’s ability to commit. This is a subtle
task, and there is no easy formula for resolving this difficulty. But this does not
necessarily lead us to an impasse, nor does it imply that its resolution needs to be
done on an ad hoc basis. Instead, liberal contract law can and should apply
qualitative judgments and identify categories of limitations on promisors’ freedom
to change their minds – consider, for example, indentured servitudes – that should
not be enforceable (in general or under certain conditions) because they overly
undermine the autonomy of their future selves.
Even more fundamentally, law should be particularly vigilant in ensuring
that contractual liability does not attach in categories of cases where contractual
commitments actually do not significantly serve the parties’ current selves.
Categories of commitment that are not autonomy‐enhancing to people’s current
selves should not be used to constrain their future selves. This prescription is the
Contra Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75 LA. L. REV. 71, 77, 98, 113
(2014).
66
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normative foundation of doctrines governing failures of both parties’ basic
assumptions, namely, mutual mistake, impossibility, impracticability, and
frustration.67
While contract theory has long grappled with transaction facilitation and
interpersonal justice, it has not shown similar concern for autonomy of the future
self. We think this is a mistake. If contract is – as indeed it should be in a liberal
setting – first and foremost about enhancing people’s self‐determination, then the
mission of empowering our current selves while safeguarding the right of our
future selves to re‐write the story of our lives must be the (or at least a) major
challenge of contract law.
3. What About Contractors’ Preferences? Legal economists may be impatient
at this point. Contract law, they often insist, should be designed – absent systemic
externalities or behavioral concerns – so it reflects what most contractors are likely
to want. But our account does not seem to apply to commercial contracts between
sophisticated legally‐informed firms, which this objection anticipates. Because it
appears to focus instead only on the limited domain of individual contracting,
whatever its normative purchase may be, it is irrelevant to general contract law.
To see why the objection misfires, we need to return to basics, and
appreciate contract’s justificatory challenge. For law to be liberal, it must follow
the harm principle.

This familiar premise makes it a challenge to justify

enforcement of wholly‐executory contracts – though their enforceability seems
self‐evident to most lawyers. Contract law authorizes a promisee to constrain the
freedom of a reneging promisor even absent detrimental reliance, applying the
law’s coercive power in the promisee’s service.

Additionally, contract law

heightens this threat to people’s negative liberty by adhering to the “objective”
approach and by applying a robust apparatus of default rules – elements that
operate to the potential detriment of idiosyncratic and legally‐uninformed parties,
respectively.
Choice theory takes this challenge seriously. Its answer relies, as we’ve
emphasized throughout, on people’s fundamental right to autonomy and on a
liberal state’s obligation to enhance individual self‐determination. This individual
67

See Dagan & Somech, supra note 61.
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right also entails modest interpersonal duties – including those arising from the
enforceability of wholly‐executory contracts, the objective approach, and the
default rule apparatus – to the extent these duties are crucial to contract law’s
autonomy‐enhancing function.
In short, we premise contract’s justification as a practice, along with each of
its particular rules, on its service to people’s autonomy, defined as the ability to
write and re‐write one’s life‐plans (and the many mini‐plans they include). This
premise means the sheer reference to most parties’ presumed intentions, which
underlies the legal economist objection, cannot provide a sufficient justification.
Rules are justified if and only if – and to the extent that – they enhance people’s
autonomy both in making commitments crucial to self‐determination and in being
able to start afresh.
This conclusion does not mean that all contract rules should be mandatory.
When legally‐informed, sophisticated firms set up commercial contracts, they
should be able to adjust their contract terms according to the type of cost and
benefit calculus that economic analyses highlight. But contract rules apply to
idiosyncratic and legally‐uninformed parties as well, even in the context of
wholly‐executory contracts.

Therefore, general contract law – as opposed to

statutes or doctrines strictly addressed to commercial contracts – must respond
first and foremost to the real people whom it serves and upon whom it exercises
coercive power and authority.
To close the loop on this argument, many contract law rules, including the
rules on specific performance, are best regarded as normative defaults chosen
because of their freestanding value, 68 and not as majoritarian defaults adopted
because of their correspondence to party preferences.69 This account requires that
For more on the notion of normative defaults and its doctrinal manifestations, see
Dagan & Dorfman, Justice for Contracts, supra note 2, at *.
68

Some readers may object, arguing that contractors are likely to prefer the rule we
advance, which limits the authority of the present self over the future self to cases in which
it is in fact needed for the former’s self‐determination. But the meaning of taking this
proposition as a given – rather than as an empirical hypothesis that may be disproved if,
for example, it turns out that people’s actual preferences are dominated by their welfarist
interest – is to subscribe to, rather than refute, our position. For more on the relationship
69
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contract law should set up its rules with individuals in mind, and then allow
sophisticated commercial firms to adjust as they see fit in the ordinary course of
legally‐informed contract drafting.
Concerns of institutional comparative advantage dovetail with this
autonomy‐enhancing approach: judges are well‐positioned to set rules – and they
should set rules – based on what seems normatively justified for transactions
between individuals. At the same time, judges should allow legally‐sophisticated
contracting firms to opt in and out of (most of) these rules. Why? Because such
firms are relatively more expert than judges in pricing and negotiating terms and
remedies that will likely serve their wealth‐maximizing aims.
With the economists’ seemingly powerful objection behind us, we come to
our core question: what should be the reach and limit of specific performance? As
we noted in the Introduction, our answers echo many of the economists’
prescriptions, but we ground them in a more robust normative foundation and we
derive different reform implications.

C. Justifying the Common Law Baseline
To start, we agree with the economists that contract law should resist the
moralists’ expansive approach to specific performance.70 Indeed, it should take
nearly the opposite approach: ensuring that doctrinal limits to the self‐
determination of the promisor’s future self are necessary to enhancing her current

between autonomy and preferences, see Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, Economic Analysis
in Law, * YALE J. REG. *, * (2021).
See supra text accompanying note 43. Cf. Curtis Bridgeman, Contracts as Plans, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 341, 384‐85 (like us, Bridgeman understands contracts as plans, but – maybe
because Bridgeman sees the planning function of contract as a means to solve
coordination problem, rather than to enhance autonomy – he presents specific
performance as “more natural” than expectation damages, and explains the
predominance of the latter by reference to second‐order concerns such as “the institutional
limitations of courts” or the parties’ presumed preference that when their relationship get
soured their shared plan will be executed “without acting together”).
70
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self’s ability to plan. Excessive remedial responses – remedies that go beyond
what is required to empower the parties’ current selves – are autonomy‐reducing.
Entrenching such remedies into contract law would impinge upon, rather than
bolster, its morality.
The mission here is to find the rules that are as conducive as practicable to
enhancing people’s autonomy. And, as usual, this is a complex task, requiring the
sort of qualitative judgment that typifies any credible autonomy‐talk. 71 Still,
addressing this challenge head‐on proves immensely fruitful: it helps vindicate
the moral underpinnings of the common‐law baseline of no specific performance
along with the uniqueness exception and the treatment of service contracts. In
other words – and this the core finding of this Article – both the common law’s
resilient reluctance towards specific performance and the pockets where such a
remedy is readily available are best explained and justified by reference to
contract’s innermost normative commitments, 72 specifically, to choice theory’s
principle of concern for the future self.
We recognize that both expectation damages and specific performance
constrain the future self: remedy law’s imposition on the future self is the
inevitable implication of its function of making people’s contractual commitments
credible so that they can properly serve as planning devises. This is why contract
law does not allow the future self to rewrite the past whenever she regrets her
commitments: 73 such a rule would deter others from dealing with her, thus
Cf. H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 834‐35 (1979)
(liberals should recognize the significance of the “unexciting but indispensable chore” of
distinguishing “between the gravity of the different restrictions on different specific
liberties and their importance for the conduct of a meaningful life.”).
71

As the text implies, we insist that the concern for the autonomy of the future self is not
external to contract. But cf. DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL
THEORY OF CONTRACT 103‐04, 108 (2003); Dori Kimel, Faulty and Harm in Breach of Contract,
in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 271, 278, 281 (Omri Ben‐Shahar & Ariel Porat eds.,
2010); Ewan McKendrick, The Common Law at Work: The Saga of Alfred McAlpine
Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd, 3(2) OX. U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 145, 172 (2003).
72

Such termination power may nonetheless be appropriate where the promisor is a
government, whose authority stands for the self‐determination of the nation at large,
which means, in a democracy, a rather robust right re‐write the story of our collective life
73
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undercutting her ability to plan using the empowering device of contract. 74
Nevertheless, there is a qualitative distinction between the constraint of expectation
damages and that of specific performance.
Requiring the promisor to cover the promisee’s expectation limits her
course of action: she now needs either to divert some of her resources for that
purpose rather than using them for her own, or to undertake some further
obligations in order to cover the cost of substituting her performance with
another’s, which the expectation measure of recovery represents.
Specific performance, in turn, goes much further than that because it dictates
a course of action through an affirmative duty. To be sure, in welfare terms the
difference between these remedies is still quantitative. Moreover, there are cases
in which the cost of specific performance for the promisor may even be lower than
that of covering expectations (this may explain some contractors’ preference for
“repair and replace”). But while these remedies may be continuous in terms of
welfare, they are nonetheless different in kind from the viewpoint of contract’s
autonomy‐enhancing telos – because specific performance qualitatively imposes
more on promisors’ self‐determination.75
Specific performance compels a promisor to act in accordance with the
contractual script. The fact this is a script she previously co‐authored certainly
mitigates this compulsion. But because self‐determination requires both the right
to write one’s future plans and the right to re‐write them and start afresh, the
additional constraint which specific performance entails nonetheless needs to be
carefully scrutinized and properly justified. Moralists and other friends of the civil
law tradition do not even attempt to offer such a justification.

(as represented by the practice of periodic elections). See Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at
100.
Notice that this concern is inapplicable in cases in which the past that the agent wishes
to rewrite is purely self‐regarding, which may explain the basic restitutionary rule in
mistaken payments law; see Hanoch Dagan, Mistakes, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1795, 1800‐02
(2001).
74

75

Cf. Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 54, at 1455.
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This may not be surprising because it is hard to see how they could justify
this excess. Consider the core case in which the civil law and the common law
diverge: a contractual duty to provide a characterless good (the famous widget),
for which the former regime allows specific performance whereas the latter limits
the promisee to her expectation interest. If receiving a widget from a specific
source was part of a person’s plan, then a check in the mail that allows her
effortlessly to receive a perfect substitute elsewhere is surely a change in the plan.
But it is a minimal change, one that does not substantively affect contract’s
function as a planning device. It is not a change that amounts to the kind of
autonomy‐based reason – a real disruption – that can qualify as a justification for
constraining the future self.76
Admittedly, in real life the difference between performance and expectation
damages may not be minimal even in this type of contract. But as long as the
difference does not affect the essence of the contractual plan, the autonomy‐based
analysis need not substantially change. After all, while some degree of stability is
essential for people’s plans to be meaningful, plans need not be fully immune from
changes. Machines are supposed to follow operating protocols to the letter, but
human beings who make plans anticipate some changes. Our plans, big and small,
tend to evolve and can often adapt without undermining our self‐determination.
Further, insofar as the expected change is purely financial – which liquidating the
promisor’s performance entails – the parties can arrange for recovery by resorting
to liquidated damages, say, for incidental costs an injured party incurs that may
be hard to monetize.77
Thus, other things being equal or close to equal for the promisee, contract
in the common law tradition rightly opts not to compel the promisor to act in

The burden here is comparable to the restitutionary burden that the basic,
uncontroversial rule of the law governing mistaken payments imposes on their recipients.
See Dagan, Restitution, supra note 54, at 222‐25.
76

77

See Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 721, 726 (1979).
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accordance with the contractual script, allowing her to choose between doing so
and covering the promisee’s expectation.78 Alas, other things are not always equal.

D. The Uniqueness Exception and Personal Services Exclusion
The same autonomy‐based commitments that justify the common law
baseline also explain much of the remaining terrain of specific performance, in
particular the uniqueness exception and the personal services exclusion. We start
with uniqueness.
1. What is “Uniqueness”? If the widget case is the canonical example in
which common law affords only damages, a purchase of a residential dwelling is
the paradigmatic case in which specific performance is granted as a matter of
course.79 Our analysis explains why. In the widget case, there is no autonomy‐
based reason for encumbering the autonomy of the promisor’s future self with the
constraint specific performance adds over and above damages. By contrast, in the
residential dwelling case, such a reason is readily available.
Like other major transactions, purchasing a home has significant financial
implications. But it involves more than that. A person’s residence is understood
in contemporary society as the paradigmatic safe‐haven; as a bastion of individual
independence and a symbol of the self. It provides an almost sacrosanct private
sphere that serves as a prerequisite to people’s personal development and
autonomy.80 Many legal doctrines protect individuals in their homes – from rent
controls and homestead exceptions in bankruptcy law to search on restrictions in
the Fourth Amendment.
The constitutive role of a home in people’s ordinary experience implies that
a purchaser’s expectation in a residential transaction typically transcends the
Cf. Chen Wishart, supra note 11, at 119; Stephen A. Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom
of Contract, 59 MOD. L. REV. 167, 179‐80 (1996).
78

79

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e.

See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991‐92, 1013
(1982). See also, e.g., Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal
Challenge?, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 580 (2002).
80
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financial stakes. Buying a unique good – most notably a residential dwelling –
involves extensive planning for how that good will be integrated into the next
chapters of one’s life. As the Nebraska Supreme Court noted in a frequently cited
case, “a purchaser of a particular piece of land may reasonably be supposed to
have considered the locality, soil, easements, or accommodations of the land
generally, which may give a peculiar or special value to the land to him, that could
not be replaced by other land of the same value, but not having the same local
conveniences or accommodations.”81 Thus, when a seller reneges on the promise
to deliver a dwelling, she is relatively more likely to disrupt the purchaser’s life
plan than if she breaches in other ordinary contracting contexts.
In autonomy terms, the “uniqueness” exception captures the core category
of cases in which breach amounts to such a disruption – in contrast to the economic
approach in which a good’s uniqueness is a function of information costs. Unlike
the minor changes in plan that breach of a widget contract prompts, disruption in
the residential context is qualitatively different and typically cannot be sufficiently
ameliorated by expectation damages. Even where no financial setback is involved,
disruptions around residential sales threaten to frustrate contract’s ability to
function as a planning tool.
Happily, law can preempt this autonomy‐undermining result by granting
specific performance. 82

Because there is an autonomy‐based reason for the

additional constraint of this remedy, liberal contract law properly follows suit for
residential sales transactions and other categories of goods in which breach
imposes the same plan‐disrupting consequences – that’s what makes these goods
“unique.” (Part IV.A sets out our proposed reforms regarding real estate sales.)
To be sure, even in these cases, specific performance may be refused if it “would
cause unreasonable hardship or loss to the party in breach.” 83 But unlike the
widget paradigm, this limited exception does not arise from the intra‐personal

81

Gartrell v. Stafford, 11 N.W. 732, 734 (Neb. 1882).

82

Cf. Karr, supra note 5, at 795; Nadler, supra note 5, at 468.

83

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364(1)(b).
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limit on the dominion of promisors’ current selves over their future selves, but
rather from choice theory’s third principle of relational justice.
Conceptualizing uniqueness as a proxy for “disruptions to the promisee’s
plan” may explain, and indeed justify, the way courts use the liberalized language
of the U.C.C. to expand the exception to the no‐specific performance rule so that it
includes cases of significant scarcity. 84 This proxy can likewise – even more
importantly – inform the Restatement’s vague standard in which specific
performance will be granted only if damages cannot “adequately” protect the
injured party’s expectancy.85 When are damages not adequate? In categories of
cases in which breach is likely to be too disruptive to promisee’s important life
plans.
This definition ensures that when parties invoke the contract convention for
their co‐authored plan, they do not encumber their future selves’ self‐
determination more than this type of plan conventionally requires.

A liberal

contract law entrenches such a rule because of its freestanding autonomy‐securing
value, not because it is what most parties prefer or can be assumed to prefer. In
other words, the common law’s scheme does not depend on its accordance with
majority preferences – like in the economic account. Rather, the limits of specific
performance derive directly from contract’s normative foundations.
2. Uniqueness as a Default. That said, liberal law should recognize that the
borderline contract sets for uniqueness is indeed conventional. This means that
there may be contractual scripts that fall outside the uniqueness category (even in
its expanded configuration) and yet their actual performance is of the essence for
the specific parties who co‐authored them.
A liberal contract law should respect those idiosyncratic plans and thus
refrain from thwarting them by mandating boundaries for specific performance.
And yet, parties’ attempts to opt into specific performance in cases that go beyond
the (expanded) uniqueness category are not to be treated casually, as if they were
garden‐variety overrides of default rules that merely mimic majoritarian

84

See supra text accompanying note 20.

85

See supra text accompanying note 14.
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preferences. Recognizing the normative weight that justifies liberal contract’s
expectation damages baseline justifies some caution when departing from it.
Treating this baseline as a normative default implies that contracting parties
should be able to override it and choose to have their script specifically enforced –
if and only if they meet two conditions: first, they signal the distinctiveness of
their plan by using “apt and certain words,” 86 and second, that there are no
conflicting obstacles such as difficulties of judicial supervision. (We detail how
this proposed reform would work in Part IV.B.)
3. Personal Service Contracts. Thus far, we’ve stayed close to the role
uniqueness plays in the existing law of specific performance. Uniqueness, we’ve
argued, can and should stand for conventional categories of breaches that are
tantamount to substantive disruptions in the promisee’s plan, as enshrined in the
contractual script. But there is another doctrinal pocket in which the idea of
uniqueness affects the common law (as well as civil law), even though this concept
is not explicitly used. Contract law accords special treatment to agreements whose
performance uniquely involves the person of the promisor – that is, to personal service
contracts.87
This personal services category may be understood as a mirror image of the
unique goods category. In the latter case, the uniqueness exception implies that
breach disrupts the promisee’s plan. In the former, it suggests that performance
might undermine the ability of the promisor to abandon a plan. Personal service
contracts are the paradigmatic case in which specific performance might trigger
autonomy‐inhibiting effects.

Ordering a worker specifically to perform her

employment contract compels her to take a specific course of action. Additionally,
that particular course of action requires her to do (and not only to deliver) specific
things and thus involves her personal cooperation with another person’s project.88

86

Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).

87

See supra text accompanying notes 23‐25.

Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 780‐85
(1983) (Kronman’s point is different from ours in that he focuses on the ex post threat that
compulsory performance poses to the promisor’s integrity or self‐respect in case her
88
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It is therefore no surprise that contract in both common law and civil law – loyal
to the innermost liberal commitment to self‐determination89 – steadfastly resists
granting specific performance for personal service contracts.90 (Our more detailed
analysis of employment contracts appears in Part IV.C, along with proposed
reforms.)

IV. IMPLICATIONS AND HARD CASES
American contract law is, at root, committed to enhancing peoples’
autonomy, that is, as their ability to write and re‐write the story of their lives. Seen
though this prism, much of the existing terrain of specific performance in the
common law snaps into focus – the preference for expectation damages, the
uniqueness exception, and the personal services exclusion. This area of law has
been so resistant to change in part because it already adheres closely to an
appealing normative framework – not the contingent, ever‐shifting one of the
economists, nor the wrongly‐conceived approach of the philosophers.
That said, there is still room for improvement. Careful attention to the
normative foundation of the law points to three areas where specific performance
should be reformed so the doctrine better complies with its deepest animating
principles.

values have changed dramatically since she entered the contract so that she can no longer
identify it as hers).
Contra SMITH, supra note 6, at 310; Arthur Ripstein, The Contracting Theory of Choices,
38 L. & PHIL. *, * (2020).
89

As Douglas Laycock notes, courts deny specific relief of personal service contracts
even if damages would be inadequate. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable
Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 688, 746 (1990).
90
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A. Circumscribing the Land Sale Exception
1. The Traditional View. Most American courts adhere to “the traditional
view” that accords “a special place” to contracts for the sale of land in the law of
specific performance. 91 Although this traditional approach comes in different
formulations and varying degrees of rigidity, it stands for the crystallization of a
more‐or‐less bright line rule in which specific performance is granted as a matter
of course to the injured party in all agreements for the sale of land.92 The question
whether the breaching party is the buyer or the seller is irrelevant in this view.
Additionally, in cases where the seller breached, courts pay no attention to
whether the buyer intended the land for private use or was in the business of
buying and selling land.93
Thus, for some courts, “an agreement of sale of real estate . . . vests in the
grantee . . . an equitable title to the real estate,” so that from the moment of its
execution, “the vendor is considered as a trustee of the real estate for the purchaser
and the latter becomes a trustee of the balance of the purchase money for the
seller.”94 Other courts simply state, for example, that “where land is the subject‐
matter of the contract, the damage is held to be irreparable as a matter of law,”95
or that in such cases “the inadequacy of the legal remedy is well settled,”96 so that

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e. The traditional view seems to
also prevail elsewhere, notably in Australia. See Pianta v. National Finance and Trustee
Ltd. (1964), 38 A.L.J.R. 232, ¶ 14 (WASC, Barwick, C.J.); Zhu v. Snell (2014), NSWSC 468,
¶ 209‐211; Fairborne Pty. Ltd. v. Strata Store Noosa Pty. Ltd. (2009) QSC 250, ¶ 14‐15
(QSC); Turner v. Bladin (1951) 82 C.L.R. 463, 473 (HCA). But see Rofiza Pty. Ltd. v.
Gangley Pty. Ltd. (2002), 11 BPR 20, 517, ¶ 36 (NSWSC).
91

See, e.g., Maryland Clay Co. v. Simpers, 53 A. 424, 426 (Md. App. 1902); Mohrlang v.
Draper, 365 N.W.2d 443, 446‐47 (Neb. 1985).
92

93

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e.

Payne v. Clarke, 187 A.2d 769, 770 (Pa. 1963). See also, e.g., Cox v. RKA Corp., 753 A.2d
1112, 1128‐29 (N.J. 2000).
94

Kann v. Wausau Abrasives Co., 129 A. 374, 378 (N.H. 1925). See also, e.g., Beaver v.
Brumlow, 231 P.3d 628, 637 (N.M. 2010).
95

96

SMS Financial, LLC v. CBC Financial Corp., 417 P.3d 70, 75 (Utah 2017).
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no further discussion is required.97 Either way, most courts conventionally refuse
to investigate the purchaser’s intended use98 or to consider withholding specific
performance where the injured party is the seller, rather than the buyer.99
2. The Path to Reform. But not all courts continue to adhere strictly to the
traditional doctrine – and these deviations point to some fruitful areas for reform.
Some courts have held that the seller “is not automatically entitled to specific
performance as a matter of right or law”100 – in sharp distinction to the buyer of real
estate. The reason seems straightforward: the “rationale underlying the grant of
specific performance in real estate transactions” does not apply to sellers,101 where
the seller’s recovery can simply follow the conventional formulas for damages.102
Other courts have challenged the traditional view even as it applies to cases
in which the injured party is the buyer. As these courts explain, when “plaintiffs
are faced with the loss of commercial, and not residential, property,” they are
“threatened with an economic loss which is compensable in large part if not

97

See Keystone Sheep Co. v. Grear, 262 P.2d 138, 142 (Wyo. 1953)

See, e.g., Justus v. Clelland, 651 P.2d 1206, 1207‐08 (Ariz. App. 1982); Phillips v. Homer
(In re Egbert R. Smith Trust), 745 N.W.2d 754, 759 (Mich. 2008); Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 314
S.E.2d 506, 512 (N.C. 1984).
98

See, e.g., Lonas v. Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co., 432 P.2d 603, 606 (Ala. 1967);
Vincent v. Vits, 566 N.E.2d 818, 819‐20 (Ill. Ct. App, 1991); Metro Holdings One, LLC v.
Flynn Creek Partner, LLC, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 643 at 32, 55; Thompson v. Kromhout,
413 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Minn. 1987); Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So.2d 1337, 1340 (Miss. 1989);
Morgan & Bro. Manhattan Storage Co. v. Balin, 47 A.D.2d 85, 89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975);
Shuptrine v. Quinn, 597 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Tenn. 1979); Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander &
Bishop, Ltd., 783 N.W.2d 294, 304‐05 (Wis. 2010). See also DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES 796, 861 (1973); Larissa Katz, Equity and “What We Have Coming to
Us,” 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. * (2020).
99

Wolf v. Anderson, 334 N.W.2d 212, 215‐16 (N.D. 1983). See also, e.g., Bailey v.
Musumeci, 591 A.2d 1316, 1318 (N.H. 1991).
100

Kesler v. Marshall, 792 N.E.2d 893, 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). See also, e.g., Centex
Homes Corp. v. Boag, 128 N.J. Super. LEXIS 682 at 7‐8, 10, 12 (1974).
101

See, e.g., Trachtenburg v. Sibarco Stations, Inc., 384 A.2d 1209, 1211‐12 (Pa. 1978);
Manning v. Bleifus, 272 S.E.2d 821, 824 (W.Va. 1980).
102
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entirely, in damages.” 103 In other words (as a recent case put it), “if land is
purchased merely to be resold and/or rented, it is being treated by the purchaser
as a fungible commodity, and such a party can be made whole via money damages
regardless of whether he might have been entitled to equitable relief had he
intended to keep and use the land.”104
Canadian courts have taken a bolder turn. Following the lead of a few
lower courts’ cases, the Canadian Supreme Court discarded (in a long dictum) the
traditional view in which “every piece of real estate was generally considered to
be unique.” The “progress of modern real estate development,” said the Court,
implies that “this is no longer the case” and there are cases in which damages are
an adequate remedy. Therefore, it concluded, specific performance should no
longer “be granted as a matter of course absent evidence that the property is
unique to the extent that its substitute would not be readily available.”105

Geneva Ltd. Partners v. Kemp, 779 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (U.S Dis. N.D. Cal. 1990). See
also Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 471 (9th Cir.
1984); Watkins v. Paul, 511 P.2d 781, 783 (Idaho 1973); Hilton v. Nelsen, 283 N.W.2d 877,
881 (Minn. 1979); Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. Kallingal, 2005 WL
2095263 at 5 (Guam 2005); Simone v. N.V. Floresta Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9578 at 30
(S.D.N.Y 1999); M&T Bank v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, WL 3577645 at 4 (U.S. D. Nev.
2019); Medgar Evers Houses Assocs., L.P. v. Carro, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18594 at 14.
103

Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Alessi & Koenig, LLC, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1220 (US.
Dist. 2019). See also Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, 87 F.3d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1996). New
Zealand’s Court of Appeals has taken a similar position. See Landco Albany Ltd v Fu Hao
Construction Ltd [2006] 2 NZLR 174 ¶ 43 (CA) (“the respondent’s interest in the land is
plainly commercial rather than private or sentimental. It must have entered into the
transaction in order to make a profit and in those circumstances damages would be an
adequate remedy”).
104

Semelhago v. Paramadevan [1996] 2 S.C.R. 415, 425, 428‐29 (Can.). See also Domowicz
v. Orsa Invts. Ltd. (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 661, ¶ 58‐60, 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.); 365733 Alberta
Ltd. v. Tiberio (2008), 439 A.R. 371, ¶ 2, 10‐11 (Alta. Q.B.) (affirmed (2008), 440 A.R. 197
(Alta. C.A.)); 410675 Alberta Ltd. v. Trail South Developments Inc. (2001), 105 A.C.W.S
(3d) 971, ¶ 50 (Alta. Q.B.); Chaulk v. Fairview Const. Ltd. (1977), 14 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 13, ¶
19, 21 (Nfld. C.A.); McNabb v. Smith (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 547, ¶ 23‐25 (B.C.S.C.)
(affirmed (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 523 (B.C.C.A.)).
105
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We hesitate in recommending the Canadian path insofar as it suggests
open‐ended equitable discretion, which the traditional approach successfully
curbs.106 Overly vague standards offend the rule of law because they effectively
authorize courts to exercise unconstrained power, which in turn inhibits law’s
ability to guide the behavior of its addressees.107 This general concern matters even
more specifically to contract because law’s effective guidance is intimately related
to people’s ability to form reasonable expectations and plan for the future.108 The
rule of law quest for predictability is grounded in contract’s own autonomy‐
enhancing telos.
That said, the Canadian view correctly warns against the over‐inclusiveness
of the broad category of land sale contracts. Is it possible to narrow the category
appropriately without embracing ad hoc discretion? Yes. The emerging minority
position in American courts deviates from the traditional view’s rigid strictures,
and does so in a way that helpfully suggests how the shortcoming of the Canadian
approach can be remedied. Bringing these points together, we suggest reading the
minority cases not as a way of returning to specific performance’s equitable‐cum‐
discretionary origins,109 but rather as a salutary step in a gradual process, typical
to the common law tradition, of more carefully circumscribing the category of cases
in which specific performance is awarded.110

106

See Chen Wishart, supra note 11, at 124.

See Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1889, 1898‐1905 (2015); see also Malcolm Lavoie, Canadaʹs ‘Unique’ Approach to
Specific Performance in Contracts for the Sale of Land: Some Theoretical and Practical Insights,
12 OX. U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 207 (2012) (noting that courts’ new discretionary authority
leads real estate buyers to seek damages rather than risk seeking specific performance).
107

See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY, 213, 220,
222 (1979).
108

Cf. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, The Case Against Equity in American Contract Law,
93 S. CAL. L. REV. * (2020).
109

Cf. Dagan, supra note 107, at 1905‐08, 1910‐11. Joseph Raz’s analysis of the
phenomenon of distinguishing cases brings home a similar point. See RAZ, supra note 108,
at 183‐97.
110
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The underlying, autonomy‐based reason that justifies specific performance
in contracts for the sale of land also suggests limiting its reach to the category of
cases in which (1) the injured party is the buyer and (2) the purchased land is
intended as a residence.111 Where both of these conditions obtain, breach is likely
to disrupt the promisee’s life plans in ways that damages alone will not address.
By contrast, there is no good autonomy‐based reason to continue specifically‐
enforcing real estate contracts on behalf of sellers or in fungible commercial cases
even where their subject‐matter is land.

B. The Proper Limits for Opt‐Ins
1. Expanding the Scope of Opt‐In. The uniqueness exception can be over‐
inclusive – as we’ve just seen. Alan Schwartz points to a mirror‐image problem.
He would expand specific performance from the other side of the autonomy
equation. A promisor’s autonomy, he argues, “is not seriously compromised by a
specific performance decree if the promisor sells roughly fungible goods or is in the
business of selling unique goods.” The reason is simple: in such cases “the goods
are assets to the promisor much like cash; requiring their delivery is not relevantly
different from requiring the delivery of cash.” By the same token, Schwartz
contends, “requiring a sizable corporation that renders services to perform for a
given promisee does not violate the corporation’s associational interests or the
associational interests of its employees.”112
Schwartz’s conclusion is that, excepting in cases of personal service
contracts, “specific performance should be available as a matter of course to those

This admittedly still leaves courts with some borderline cases, notably of units in
condominiums and cooperative apartments, which often are identical to hundreds with
the same layout in the same (or similar) building, but at times are adapted to buyers’
specifications. See, e.g., Schwinder v. Austin Bank, 809 N.E.2d 180, 196 (Ill. App. 2004);
Lezell v. Forde, 26 Misc. 3d 435, 446‐47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
111

112

See Schwartz, supra note 77, at 297 (the emphases are ours).
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promisees who request it.”113 We think that this conclusion is too quick. Behind
the “artificial persons” of corporate bodies stand real people, and at times the law
ultimately serves the choices and plans those real people are seeking to make.114
Moreover, as Schwartz’s careful language suggests (the part we italicized above),
in some cases it would be difficult to determine whether specific performance
seriously jeopardizes the promisor’s autonomy or not. But when liberal contract
law sets its background rules – guided, as it should be, first and foremost by its
fundamental commitment to enhancing people’s autonomy – it should avoid,
absent any countervailing autonomy‐based consideration, imposing rules that might be
autonomy‐reducing. A normative default, like the common law baseline, should
not be too easily discarded.
That said, Schwartz’s claims provide a powerful case for allowing
contracting parties affirmatively to opt into specific performance when their
agreement indeed fits Schwartz’s description of the transaction. That is, specific
performance should be an option when it does not implicate – and thus might not
endanger – the self‐determination of the promisor’s future self. The economic
analysis discussed above may suggest that rational maximizers would, more often
than not, refrain from making this choice.115 But at times, even for these parties,
Id. at 306. Most of Schwartz’s reasons for this conclusion are economic. With Scott
and Kraus, however, we think that the economic analysis leads to the opposite conclusion.
See supra text accompanying note 36.
113

As the text implies, this is surely not always the case. We do not offer here an
autonomy‐based account of incorporated persons that transcends their economic
function, an account that is urgently needed in private law theory.
114

See supra text accompanying note 36. See also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 321 (6th ed. 2010) (doubting whether “the authorization for
specific performance where the contract so provides would have real impact.”); Yonathan
A. Arbel, Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 369 (2015)
(plaintiffs tend to opt out of specific performance due to difficulties of execution, even in
a jurisdiction [Israel] where it is readily available). Cf. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 12
(studying 2,347 contracts of public corporations, and observing that a majority of contracts
do not include specific performance clauses, and that, among those which do, there is
substantial variation among different contract types). But see Theresa Arnold et. al.,
Lipstick on a Pig: Specific Performance Clauses in Action, 2021 WISC. L. REV. * (analyzing a
dataset of more than 1000 M&A contracts, and concluding that “Basically, everyone in
115
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actual performance may be of the essence. Where the parties affirmatively indicate
that their specific plan requires the backstop of specific performance, a liberal
contract law should – absent conflicting considerations – facilitate their choice.116
2. Equity’s Troubling Legacy. Unfortunately, the common law does not
comply with this position. As the Idaho Supreme Court noted in a recent case,
“[a] contract clause which gives a non‐breaching party the right to elect the remedy
of specific performance does not require a court to award specific performance.”
Instead, its only effect is to provide “some additional support to finding that
specific performance is equitable.”117
We agree there are important reasons (addressed below) that may justify
overriding the parties’ choice to include a specific performance clause in their
contract. And we agree these reasons validate the conclusion that such a clause
should guide, and not bind, the court. But courts can and should go further than
they have been willing to go in accommodating party choice. For now, they just
indicate that the parties’ resort to a specific performance clause “may guide a trial
court’s equitable determination.” 118 That’s not good enough. Courts need to
explain the circumstances that would justify their refusal to be guided by the
parties’ choice – and there is only a limited list of acceptable explanations.
Courts’ plenary discretionary power regarding the enforceability of specific
performance clauses is a product of the equitable origin of specific performance.
“Parties cannot by contract compel a court of equity to exercise its powers,”119 says
one court. The Restatement adds, “[b]ecause the availability of equitable relief was
this market uses specific performance clauses” and that the most consistent explanation
for why parties want specific performance as a remedy is that they don’t think that judges
would give them the appropriate amount of money damages their bargain demanded).
See supra text accompanying note 86. See also, e.g., Kronman, supra note 34, at 371, 376;
Jonathan Morgan, On the Nature and Function of Remedies for Breach of Contract, in
COMMERCIAL REMEDIES, supra note 11, at 23, 43‐44.
116

117

Fazzio v. Mason, 249 P.3d 390, 397 (Idaho 2011).

Reeder v. Carter, 740 S.E.2d 913, 919 (N.C. App. 2013). See also, e.g., Ritchie Bros.
Auctioneers (Am.) v. Best Rental Corp. SE, 2014 WL 896992 at *2 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2014).
118

119

Black v. American Vending Co., 238 S.E.2d 420, 421 (Ga. 1977).
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historically viewed as a matter of jurisdiction,” the parties are deemed incapable
“to vary by agreement” the preconditions of that jurisdiction.120 But as Ian Macneil
noted, the doctrine’s arbitrary historical origins obscure the present‐day effect of
this excessive discretionary power: it unjustifiably curtails contract’s autonomy‐
enhancing function.121
Disabling the parties from affecting contract law’s remedial scheme is one
of the few areas in which the common law does get close to transfer theory – but
this is a vice, not a virtue in our view. For transfer theorists, as Benson explains,
breach is tantamount to conversion, so contract remedies must not be understood
as “the contingent product of the parties’ individual or joint decisions.” In other
words, there is – there must be – a “legally categorical difference between terms
and remedies.” Remedies represent “the law’s coercive response to the civil
wrong of breach.” Therefore, the parties can inform the court of facts that may be
relevant for that response, but they do not have the power to determine the
parameters of that response.122
Transfer theory is, however, wrong on this fundamental point. As we’ve
shown above (and in more depth elsewhere), breach is not tantamount to
conversion.123 Therefore, there is no reason categorically to deprive the parties of
the power to determine remedies in the ordinary course of contracting. Quite the
contrary. The parties’ plans should, as they often do, cover the eventuality of
breach as well. If they ex ante decide together that specific performance is the best

120

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 cmt. a.

See Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 495, 521‐
23 (1962).
121

BENSON, supra note 46, at 207‐09, 212‐13, 255, 261‐62, 313 (discussing liquidated
damages); but see Friedmann, supra note 27, at 23 (who perceives remedies as default rules
notwithstanding his [implicit] endorsement of transfer theory).
122

See supra text following note 47; see also DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 1, at 36‐40;
Dagan & Heller, Autonomy Refined, supra note 1, at *.
123
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response for this contingency, 124 an autonomy‐enhancing contract law should
generally not hesitate to provide this remedy.
Though it goes beyond the scope of this Article, our approach equally
supports (absent concerns of relational injustice) enforcement of liquidated
damages clauses that amount to penalties. Penalty clauses can have the effect of
coercing specific performance, and to the extent they do so, both should be
evaluated through the same normative framework.
3. The Proper Limits on Party Choice. We can and should discard the
excessive discretion that arises from the doctrine’s equitable origin. Fixing the law
in this way does not imply, however, that courts must always rubber‐stamp
parties’ specific performance clauses.125 As always, the hard work is to find the
most autonomy‐enhancing line between categorical extremes.
In brief, judicial scrutiny should respond to party choice, but not in an ad‐
hoc manner. Refusal to enforce specific performance clauses should comply with
the rule of law, which is, as noted, particularly important for contract’s planning
function. 126 This means courts should be guided by fairly precise rules or by
guidance‐friendly standards. Such rules and standards enable their addressees (or
their lawyers) to figure out their intended content in advance and thus to predict
future effects and possible applications.127

See, e.g., Fazzio v. Mason, 249 P.3d at 397 (“the inclusion of the clause shows that
specific performance was within contemplation of the parties and may have been part of
reason the Fazzios entered into the settlement agreements and allowed Mason to extend
the closing date.”).
124

In other words, courts indeed “ought to consider and reflect other interests in
devising a system of contract remedies.” Kakaes v. George Washington Univ., 790 A.2d
581, 584‐85 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002).
125

126

See supra text following note 107.

Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 58, 65‐66, 69 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames
eds., 2011).
127
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Our discussion thus far implies four autonomy‐based reasons for a court to
refuse to enforce a specific performance clause – but if none of these applies, then
the parties’ remedial choice should be respected:
(1) A specific performance clause should not be enforced where this is
simply impossible, a proviso that applies even in civil law systems.128
(2) Parties must not be able to opt into this remedy where it necessarily
threatens self‐determination, such as with service contracts whose performance –
as noted above and elaborated below129 – intimately implicates the person of the
promisor.
(3) Parties should not be entitled to burden courts with excessive costs of
supervision.130 This guideline reflects a broader category of limits on freedom of
contract in cases where the parties’ agreement imposes substantial negative
external (third‐party) effects.131
(4) Finally, as with any other contractual term, a specific performance clause
should be unenforceable when it goes below the floor of relational justice.132 An
important example for this category – and one in which, unfortunately, American
courts do grant specific performance – is mandatory arbitration and no‐class‐action
clauses which upset consumers and employees’ background expectations of access
to courts or to reasonably equivalent procedures for dispute resolution.133

128

See supra text accompanying note 7.

129

See supra text accompanying notes 87‐90 and infra text accompanying notes 139‐151.

130

See supra note 15.

See generally Dagan & Heller, Autonomy Refined, supra note 1, at *. A typical category,
which falls somewhere between the first and second guidelines, involves cases where a
promise has been conveyed to an innocent third party. As Kronman correctly argues, the
proper response in these cases is to “impose a constructive trust for the promisee’s benefit
on the profit realized by the resale (that is, the difference between the resale price and the
original contract price), even though this may exceed the damages the promisee has
suffered.” See Kronman, supra note 34, at 376‐82.
131

132

See supra text leading to note 58.

133

See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 1, at 112.
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Enumerating these reasons here is sufficient to demonstrate the viability of
a predictable and justifiable legal framework for judicial scrutiny of specific
performance (and penalty) clauses, one that ensures an autonomy‐enhancing
residual rule of enforcement. Some of these reasons may and probably should be
further refined by courts, legislatures, and code drafters.134
Be that as it may, remedies can be, as we’ve claimed, material to a contract’s
substantive terms; terms can depend on remedies. Parties may care about both.
It’s unprincipled to refuse to recognize party choice simply because of a remedy’s
accidental historical origin in equity jurisdiction.135 Respecting autonomy means
parties should be able to elect specific performance ex ante, and courts should grant
the remedy ex post, subject to the four caveats just noted.

C. Employment Contracts
1. The Autonomy Basis for the Personal Services Exclusion. We turn now to the
last major component of specific performance doctrine, dealing with exclusion of
employment contracts. The recent Restatement (Third) of Employment Law states
a bright‐line rule: “An employer may not obtain specific performance of the
employee’s promise to work.”136 We assume that, like us, many readers would
find this rule nearly a truism. But this wasn’t the law until the nineteenth century.
Quite the contrary. Employment contracts were enforced through both specific

For example, as the Restatement notes, courts refuse specific performance if the
provision was the result of oppression or imposition, or if the agreement was, in general,
one‐sided or otherwise unfair. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364(1)(b).
134

To clarify: there is nothing objectionable in celebrating equity’s capacity to refine the
rules of contract law so that they are properly fine‐tuned to their autonomy‐enhancing
task. But celebrating this capacity is very different from endorsing an authority to apply
ad‐hoc judgment prospectively. In a liberal system, it is justified to require people to incur
some of the costs of having public officials normatively refine the law; but it is not justified
to require people to be subject to ad‐hoc discretion by these officials.
135

136

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.08(a) (2015).
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performance and criminal penalties – it took a lengthy and concerted effort to
create the personal services contract exclusion.137
Banning specific enforcement of employment contracts has not been cost‐
free – even to employees. As Christopher Wonnell argues, “rational reasons exist
for employees to bind themselves to particular employers for a specific period of
time.” Such arrangements, he explains, “can avoid the high costs of delayed
productivity, prevent the risk of situational monopolies due to detrimental reliance,
and shift some of the risks of one’s employment productivity to the employer.”
Therefore, he concludes, current law disempowers employees by preventing them
from extracting “more favorable terms from employers in exchange for enforceable
promises to fulfill their parts of the bargain.”138
In some contexts, the pro‐enforcement view may be readily dismissed
because of employers’ market power or other concerns of relational injustice in the
formation of employment contracts. But the rule is not limited to such cases or
even to labor markets typified by these characteristics. Thus, if this rule’s plenary
scope is to be justified, we must look elsewhere.
Autonomy is the right starting point. As Mindy Chen Wishart argues, “the
bar to specific performance of contracts of personal services (where damages are
most likely to be inadequate)” is best explained by reference to individuals’ right
“to reassess and to break from past commitments, especially long‐term or personal
commitments.”139 Indeed, as we’ve noted above, the right to re‐write the story of
one’s life is most impinged where specific performance means that one’s future
self is compelled to do specific things – by requiring someone personally to
cooperate with another’s project.140 This autonomy‐based reason is why modern
(liberal) contract law is justified in limiting the ability of employees’ current selves

137

See ROBERT J. STEINFEL, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION
4 (1991).

IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350‐1870, at

Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 87, 115, 145 (1993).
138

139

Chen Wishart, supra note 11, at 117, 121.

140

See supra text accompanying note 88.
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to commit – even where this limitation means they pay a cost for their future
selves’ freedom.
Wonnell counters that this limit is a form of paternalism. 141 In turn,
paternalism is unjustified because it distrusts people’s agency and thus offends
their autonomy.142 This line of reasoning might be a devastating critique of our
approach – but only if we relied on people’s imperfect insight to ground the no‐
enforcement rule.
Fortunately, our account does not assume imperfect insight, as we
discussed earlier,143 and thus it is not vulnerable to this paternalism charge. In
choice theory, contract enforcement is justified – and therefore circumscribed – by
reference to its autonomy‐enhancing function. This means attempts to use this
instrument that are likely to be autonomy‐reducing must be treated as ultra vires (at
least prima facie). In other words, contract cannot legitimately contravene the
autonomy of the future self, properly understood.
Employment is not the only context in which the current self, attempting to
use contract as a planning device for long‐term interactions, nevertheless faces
limits on committing the future self’s autonomy. The law governing co‐ownership
of land strictly limits people’s ability to use contract to lock themselves together:
the rights to sell one’s share of co‐owned land and to initiate a partition action are
semi‐inalienable, and can thus be suspended contractually only for limited
periods.144 Likewise, the law of spousal contracts refuses to enforce arrangements
that jeopardize a spouse’s decision to exit, prohibiting any “provision that by its
terms disfavors a party because that party initiates the divorce action.”145
141

See Wonnell, supra note 138, at 88.

See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation,
29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 207, 213, 215, 220, 231 (2000).
142

143

See supra text accompanying note 65.

144

See Dagan & Heller, supra note 3, at 568‐69, 597‐600.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.08(3) & cmt. c. (2000) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. In some states, “covenant” marriage sanctions some
cooling‐off by allowing spouses to commit to a time‐limited waiting period before
145

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Dagan & Heller

Page 52

Such limits on the power to commit make successful cooperation more
challenging and thus costlier.

A strong right to exit tends to undermine

interpersonal sharing and trust by exacerbating the difficulty of collective action,
inviting

opportunism,

and

threatening

cooperation

even

in

long‐term

relationships.146 But this burden the parties’ current selves incur – these limits on
their ability to contract – is the inevitable price of liberal contract law’s
commitment to autonomy. An autonomy‐enhancing contract law – committed to
people’s right both to write and rewrite their life story – must ensure some ability
to withdraw or to refuse to further engage; to dissociate, to cut oneself out of a
relationship with other persons.147
There is much to say beyond the scope of this Article on how liberal law
can (and to some extent does) accommodate its loyalty to the self‐determination
of people’s current and future selves in the contexts of co‐ownership and spousal
contracts.148 Here, we aim simply to highlight the common denominator among
the core examples.

All three cases – marriage, co‐ownership of land, and

employment – typically involve “ground projects,” that is, the projects that make
people who they are and give meaning to their lives.149 This constitutive quality is
why liberal law treats the future self’s change of mind as a “conclusive reason,”
one that justifiably overrides the current self’s choices.150

divorce. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 272‐275.1, 307‐309 (West 2000). This option
is unobjectionable if (but only if) it allows immediate exit from psychologically or
physically abusive relationships.
See Dagan & Heller, supra note 3, at 574‐77. Exit is particularly threatening to
egalitarian communities because it exacerbates the challenges of brain‐drain, adverse
selection, and free‐riding. See RAN ABRAMITZKY, THE MYSTERY OF THE KIBBUTZ:
EGALITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A CAPITALIST WORLD 250‐51, 263 (2018).
146

147

See Dagan & Heller, supra note 3, at 567‐69.

See Dagan & Heller, supra note 3, at 581‐602; Hanoch Dagan, Intimate Contracts and
Choice Theory, 7 EUR. CONTRACT L. & THEORY (forthcoming 2022).
148

149

See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 54, at 1419.

150

Cf. supra text accompanying notes 60‐62.
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Indeed, at least since the decline of feudalism, work has figured
prominently in people’s adult lives not only as a means to an end. Although it is
surely a means as well, work is also a ground project; for many, it is the
quintessential one.151 This is why excessively limiting the promisor’s control over
her work is autonomy‐defying and thus, by definition, beyond the justifiable limits
of contract.
2. The Asymmetry of Employer and Employee. Understanding the liberal
foundation to the bar on specific performance of personal service contracts leads
to an important reformist payoff: the autonomy criterion does not bind
symmetrically in the employment context – unlike the co‐ownership and marriage
cases in which it applies equally to all contracting parties.152 As a consequence, the
law should not necessarily apply the same rules to employers as it does to
employees. In many cases, the labor market is typified by a corporate employer
with many employees (at times, thousands) with whom it has no personal
connection. In these cases, a bright‐line immutable bar to specific performance
when the employee is the injured party cannot be justified, and indeed should be
rejected.
We do not state this reform as a blanket rule. There are some contexts –
think of a small business with a few employees or a small family corporation – in
which the employment relationship is indeed intimately connected to the
employer’s life project. In such cases, the “traditional unwillingness of courts of
equity to enforce contracts for personal service either at the behest of the employer
or of the employee”153 remains fully justified. As always, the challenge is to draw
sufficiently precise boundaries such that people can reliably plan ex ante, while
remaining true to contract’s animating principles.

The term “ground project” in this context should not be equated with career but with
(at least minimally) meaningful work. Without some such measure, selling one’s labor –
promising to comply with the employer’s directives – is tantamount to a consensual
subordination to another’s authority.
151

152

Contra Chen Wishart, supra note 11, at 121.

153

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974).
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The crucial difference between employee and employer implies that, at the
very least, absent any other conflicting reason (such as excessive judicial
supervision costs), specific performance should be available to employees where
the parties agree to such a remedy.154 Unfortunately, here again the common law
fails – as with the other legitimate attempts consensually to expand the scope of
specific performance we discussed earlier.155 As the Restatement notes, in non‐
statutory cases, “a court will almost never grant reinstatement of an individual
providing services in a personal‐services contract.” And courts consistently refuse
to specifically enforce “an employer’s agreement, promise, or statement” that it
will continue to employ an employee. 156 This common law position is wholly
unwarranted – and it stands in contrast with statutory contexts, particularly in
collective bargaining agreements, in which unlawfully dismissed employees are
routinely reinstated.157
The significance of work to employees’ self‐determination implies that
where the employment relationship is purely instrumental to their employers, the
alternative of opting into specific performance should be readily available to
employees and not to employers.

Cf. DOBBS, supra note 99, at 929‐30; YORIO & THEL, supra note 11, § 14.4.1, at 14‐28. As
the text suggests, it is unclear whether this asymmetry suffices in cases of structural
inequality of power between employers and employees. We think that the answer to this
important concern – the acceptability of the prevailing at‐will default regime – depends
on the presence of mandatory countermeasures strong enough to secure relational justice.
Cf. Aditi Bagchi, The Employment Relationship as an Object of Employment Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEW PRIVATE LAW, supra note 46, at 351.
154

155

See supra Section IV.B.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.04(a) & cmt. b. Compare id., at § 2.02
(listing contractual variations from at‐will employment).
156

See id, at § 9.04(a) cmt. c (mentioning that “[e]mployment statutes often provide as a
presumptive remedy reinstatement of employees to positions the employees held before
their employment was unlawfully terminated” and that “[c]ollective bargaining
agreements . . . typically empower arbitrators to award similar relief,” but adding that in
all other cases, which are “governed by common law” courts, “as a general matter have
not awarded reinstatement as a remedy”).
157
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3. Non‐Compete Agreements and Autonomy. This critique leads us to our last
point: the great challenge that employee non‐compete agreements – which have
become endemic in recent years158 – present to an autonomy‐enhancing contract
law. Some (perhaps many) of these interpersonal agreements are abusive, but not
all of them. The abusive ones are easy cases: they should not be enforceable. The
most pointed normative difficulty arises instead from non‐abusive agreements.
Many come about where the current self makes a plan that is genuinely
empowering – in exchange for agreeing to a non‐compete, the employee not only
earns more, but also gains upgraded skills that may open up new professional
horizons. 159
The existing doctrine governing non‐competes is complex, varies widely
across jurisdictions, and is currently in substantial flux. 160 The unifying point,
however, is that where a non‐compete imposes a significant encumbrance on the
future self, specific performance is not granted even where such quid pro quos are
generally available. Liberal contract law cannot remain agnostic towards severe
limitations on the ability of the employee’s future self to rewrite the story of her
life.
Setting the proper limits for specific performance here, however, is
genuinely difficult. Safeguarding the future‐self’s right to rewrite her life story
may not only impose costs on the current self, but also, as just noted, limit the
autonomy‐enhancing potential that an employment contract could have generated
in the first instance.161 The significant challenge that liberal contract law faces in
this context is to develop rule‐of‐law‐friendly informative standards and
See THE WHITE HOUSE, NON‐COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE,
POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES 3 (2016).
158

See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The Case for Noncompetes, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 953, 969‐71, 1029‐30 (2020) (noncompetes encourage firms to invest in cultivating
intellectual and human capital). But see ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE
SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013).
159

See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non‐Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939 (2012);
J.J. Prescott et al., Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey
Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369.
160

161

See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 (1993).
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categories that properly accommodate the conflicting autonomy claims of
employees’ current and future selves.
The basic thrust of the informative standards now applied in many
jurisdictions – examining the reasonableness of non‐competes in terms of
occupational, geographic, and temporal scope162 – seems, well, reasonable, at least
as a first approximation. Additionally, the rapid pace of reform among American
states on non‐competes is pointing toward more autonomy‐friendly boundaries
for the doctrine, such as, for example, categorically refusing enforcement against
low‐wage, seasonal, and unskilled employees.163 For the moment – and this is
quite a recent phenomenon – both legislative and judicial reforms are better
aligning non‐compete law with its underlying autonomy imperatives.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The preference for damages over specific performance in Anglo‐American
law goes way back, at least to 1616, with Lord Coke’s opinion in Bromage v.
Genning. 164 For over 400 years, common law courts have hemmed in specific
performance, with a handful of exceptions and exclusions – in sharp contrast with
the civil law tradition.

Today, comparativists catalog small oscillations –

convergences and divergences – among these regimes, while historians trace the
contingent path of specific performance through courts of equity and law. Legal
economists offer contingent reasons to endorse the current state of affairs, while
legal philosophers bemoan the resilience of the expectation principle. But none of
these disciplines persuasively answers the question we started with: When should
specific performance be available for breach of contract?

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. d. See also, e.g., Suresh Naidu,
Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV.
536, 595 (2018).
162

For a recent analysis, collecting citations, see Karla Walter, The Freedom to Leave,
AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG (Jan. 9, 2019).
163

164

81 Eng. Rep. 540.
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This Article provides the answer: respect for autonomy of the future self
explains why damages rather than specific performance are the ordinary remedy
for contract breach. The same normative commitment to the contracting parties’
autonomy explains the “uniqueness exception” and the personal services
exclusion. For the most part, the boundaries of specific performance track the
common law’s fundamental normative structure. But not entirely. There’s still
work to be done, and this Article points the way.
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